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Overwhelming evidence indicates that physicians routinely ignore patient preferences about life-sustaining care. Yet, the ability of wrongfully treated
patients to recover compensatory damages has recently been placed in doubt.
Both courts and commentators have suggested that actions for unconsented life
support are analogous to actions for wrongful life and should, for that reason,
be rejected. In this Article, Professor Philip Peters argues that the obvious
similarity between the two kinds of claims is overshadowed by many factors
that distinguish the two settings. As a result, Professor Peters concludes that a
physician who wrongfully administers life-sustaining care over the objections of
the patient or her proxy should be liable for compensatory damages.
INTRODUCTION

With the nation's attention now focused on assisted suicide, it would
be natural to assume that the earlier battles over patient authority to refuse
unwanted life-sustaining care had been won. Indeed, as a matter of legal
doctrine, a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining care is virtually absolute.
In hospital wards, however, that right is often illusory. In 1995, a major
study of physician behavior, called the "SUPPORT study," confirmed what
many smaller studies had previously suggested-physicians routinely ignore
patient instructions about end-of-life medical care.' Even more alarmingly,
this study found that a multi-million dollar intervention designed to
improve respect for patient preferences had virtually no impact on physician behavior. Last spring, these investigators published three more studies
further confirming the dismal truth-patient preferences rarely affect
treatment decisions. 2
1. See A Controlled Trial to Improve Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to
Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274
JAMA 1591 (1995) [hereinafter SUPPORT].
2. See Joan M. Teno et al., Advance Directives for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients:
Effectiveness with the Patient Self-Determination Act and the SUPPORT Intervention, 45 J.
AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 500 (1997) [hereinafter Teno et al., Advance Directives for Seriously
Ill] (finding that the use of advance directives did not improve patient-physician communication
or affect treatment decisions, even with the SUPPORT intervention, and that half of the
advance directives given to hospitals upon admission were not placed in the patients' charts);
Joan M. Teno et al., Do Advance Directives Provide Instructions That Direct Care?, 45 J. AM.
GERIATRICS Soc'Y 508 (1997) [hereinafter Teno et al., Do Advance Directives] (concluding that
advance directives are typically too general to guide medical decision making and that specific
instructions are violated half of the time); Joan M. Teno et al., The Illusion of End-of-Life Resource
Savings with Advance Directives, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 513 (1997) (finding that the
increased use of advance directives was not associated with a reduced resource use).
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Given this clinical data, it should not be surprising that the number of
lawsuits complaining of unwanted life support appears to be increasing
Standing in the way, however, is a surprisingly serious doctrinal obstacle.
Lawsuits seeking damages for the unwanted extension of life bear a strong
resemblance to actions for wrongful life. In wrongful life cases, disabled
children allege that they were born because the defendant negligently
deprived their parents of the opportunity to prevent their conception or
birth. These children, like patients who complain about unconsented life
support, contend that life itself is a compensable injury. Concerns about
this contention have led nearly all courts to reject claims for wrongful life.
If courts treat actions for unconsented life support as analogous, they are
likely to reject them as well.
In October 1996, the Ohio Supreme Court became the first court to
consider this argument against allowing recovery for unconsented life sup-

port. In Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, Inc.,4 the court relied
on Ohio case law rejecting recovery for wrongful life and denied recovery
for unconsented care. Although the court conceded that physicians are
legally required
to accede to a patient's refusal of life-extending medical
5.
treatment, it nevertheless concluded that the prolongation of life is not a
legally cognizable injury. As a result, the physician's breach of duty was a
6
wrong "for which there simply should be no monetary compensation.
The timing of this judicial opinion is exquisitely ironic. Judicial
endorsement of the wrongful life analogy comes literally on the heels of
clinical research confirming both that patient preferences are regularly
ignored and also that this problem is deeply entrenched and resistant to
costly cures. These two events-the SUPPORT studies and the judicial
endorsement of the wrongful life analogy-frame the subject matter of this
Article. The discussion that follows explores whether compensatory damages should be awarded to patients who are kept alive after they or their
proxies have requested that life-sustaining efforts cease.
3.

See Tamar Lewin, Ignoring "Right to Die" Directives, Medical Community Is Being Sued,

N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 1996; see also 1 ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 2.4, at 51 (2d ed. 1995).
4. 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).

5. See id. at 227.
6. Id. at 228. Since then, a Michigan trial court has reached the same conclusion. See
Osgood v. Genesys Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 94-26731-NH (Mich. Cit. Ct. Mar. 7, 1997)
(Opinion/Order as to defendant hospital's post-judgment motions) (reducing the judgment from
$16.5 million to under $2 million). The case was settled prior to appeal.
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Predictably, the wrongful life analogy provides a useful starting point
for examining complaints about unwanted life support. Because both
wrongful life claims and actions for unconsented life support contend that
life can be a compensable injury, they both raise questions about respect for
life and the calculability of damages. But the wrongful life analogy is only a
starting point for satisfactory exploration of the merits of a claim for
wrongful resuscitation because wrongful treatment claims differ from
wrongful life claims in several crucial respects. Public policy, for example,
clearly supports the empowerment of patients and their proxies to decide
whether life-extending treatment would be beneficial. In addition, children bringing wrongful life claims already receive some indirect legal protection through the wrongful birth actions that most states confer upon
their parents. Furthermore, the calculation of damages-a problem less
daunting than the wrongful life decisions have assumed-is more manageable at the end of life, when evidence of the patient's deliberations and the
jury's ability to draw upon their own family and community experiences
with end-of-life decision making will enhance the jury's ability to fairly
assess damages. Unlike wrongful life cases, actions for unconsented life
support also raise questions about the interplay between equitable and legal
remedies.
These differences make it inappropriate to rely too readily on an analogy to the wrongful life cases. Instead, actions for wrongful life support
warrant a thorough and independent analysis. This Article undertakes that
analysis. Part I examines the bleak picture painted by existing data about
physician behavior. Part II then reviews the law governing damage actions
for unconsented life support, including the recent decisions endorsing the
wrongful life analogy. The next two parts turn to the two unique policy
concerns that doomed wrongful life claims and that potentially apply to
damage actions by wrongfully resuscitated patients as well. Part III
addresses the fear that recognition of a cause of action would show a disrespect for life, and Part IV examines doubts that damages can be fairly
calculated. In each of these parts, I conclude that crucial factual differences between actions for unconsented life support and actions for wrongful life make the objections much less powerful at the end of life. The
remainder of the Article then examines the fundamental issues of justice
and deterrence raised when physicians provide unwanted life support.
First, Part V explores the requirements of corrective justice and the
emerging, but ultimately unpersuasive, view that partial recovery would
provide an adequate remedy. Part VI then considers the goal of deterrence,
examines the fear that liability will produce an undesirable chilling effect
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on emergency medical care, and suggests how the underlying cause of

action could be tailored to avoid this risk.
I.

THE CLINICAL DATA

The same medical revolution that has given Americans longer,
healthier, and more productive lives also has made it possible to prolong
death in ways that many Americans fear.7 In the face of this technological
paradox, the courts have recognized that patients and their surrogates may
not wish to use all of the available life-sustaining technologies.' Sadly, the
medical evidence also indicates that patient preferences are routinely
ignored.
The most ambitious and highly awaited study was undertaken under
the sponsorship of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. In 1995, Phase
I of the Study to Understand Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes
and Risks of Treatment (SUPPORT) enrolled 9105 patients with lifethreatening illnesses in five hospitals for a two-year study of clinical
practices at the end of life. Phase II conducted a two-year controlled
clinical trial of interventions intended "to improve end-of-life decision
making and reduce the frequency of a mechanically supported, painful and
prolonged process of dying." 9
Phase I of the study revealed a disappointing failure of communication
between patients and their physicians. Only 48% of the physicians could
accurately identify their patients' preferences for cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), even though all of the patients enrolled in the study were
seriously ill and nearly half (48%) were expected to die within six
months.' l Similarly, nearly half (49%) of the patients who wished to have
CPR withheld never had a do-not-resuscitate (DNR) order written."
Disturbed by these findings, the study's investigators and leading physicians designed an intervention program to improve communication and
decision making.' This Phase II intervention employed nurses to provide
7. See SUPPORT, supra note 1, at 1591.
8. See infra text at notes 114-115 and 193-195.
9. SUPPORT,supra note 1, at 1591.

10. See id. at 1593-94.
11. See id. at 1594. In addition, 46% of the DNR orders were written within two days of
death; 38% of the patients who died spent at least 10 days in an intensive care unit; and, of those

patients who died, 50% reportedly suffered moderate or severe pain at least half of the time. See

id. at 1591.
12. See id. at 1592. The investigators hoped to achieve these goals "by providing timely
and reliable prognostic information, by eliciting and documenting patient and family prefer-
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treating physicians with accurate prognostic information and timely reports
of patient or surrogate preferences'-the two most important factors cited
by physicians when making end-of-life treatment decisions. 4 To the obvious distress of the researchers, the Phase II intervention failed to significantly improve communication: only 40% of the patients discussed CPR
with their physicians, as compared to 37% in the control group." Nor did
the intervention improve outcomes in the five clinical areas targeted by
the researchers: (1) the incidence and timing of DNR orders; (2) physician
knowledge of patient CPR preferences; (3) the number of days that
patients spent in an intensive care unit, comatose, or receiving mechanical
ventilation; (4) the level of reported pain; and (5) the use of hospital
resources." Moreover, the researchers could not find any subset of patients
for whom outcomes had improved. 7
Phase 1I's failure to improve physician knowledge of patient preferences is especially disturbing because physicians received at least one report
of patient preferences in 78% of the cases.' 8 According to one reviewer,
physicians acknowledged receiving these reports in only 34% of the cases.'9
How alarmed should we be by these findings? On the one hand, the
inevitable limitations of a single study caution against unduly dramatic
conclusions. Other interventions might be more successful than the one
attempted here. 0 Perhaps, for example, physician facilitators would have
ences... and by providing a skilled nurse to help carry out the needed discussions, convene the
meetings and bring to bear the relevant information." Id.
13. See id. at 1596.
14. See Deborah J.Cook et al., Determinants in Canadian Health Care Workers of the Decision
to Withdraw Life Support from the CriticallyIll, 273 JAMA 703, 705 tbl.2 (1995).
15. See SUPPORT, supra note 1, at 1592. Of those who did not have such a discussion,
41% said they would have liked to discuss CPR. See id. at 1595.
16. See id. at 1592. Nor did outcomes improve over time to reflect evolving ethics and
policy. See id. at 1596.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 1594. A nurse clinician either gave a patient's advance directive to the physupra note 2,
sician or placed it in the chart. See Teno et al., Advance Directives for Seriously Ill,
at 502.
19. See Bernard Lo, Improving Care near the End of Life: Why Is It So Hard?, 274 JAMA
1634, 1635 (1995).
20. One commentator pointed out that the study may have overenrolled patients and physicians who were uncomfortable dealing with death. See Greg A. Sachs, Letter, 275 JAMA 1229
(1996). Because the study enrolled patients in the hospital, it may have lost those patients and
physicians opting for palliative care rather than death in an ICU.
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more success than nurses." And the means of communication between the
nurses and physicians may have been poorly designed." In addition, most
patients and families were satisfied with their treatment. 23 Furthermore,
the five outcomes criteria used in the study appear to assume that aggressive care near death is improper, an assumption that is inaccurate in cases
in which the patient's prognosis is not hopeless.24
On the other hand, the study's failure also provides substantial reason
for deep disappointment. This intervention was designed and, at least to
some extent, undertaken by physicians committed to an improvement in
the process. The five participating hospitals had been chosen for "their
willingness to undertake a substantial and controversial challenge."2 The
nurses engaged to improve the communications were "committed, energetic and highly trained." 6 Furthermore, the study had enough statistical
power to detect even small positive effects.2 7 Yet, the investigators could
find no evidence of success.28
More importantly, the disappointing findings of the SUPPORT study
are consistent with evidence from other smaller studies, many of which
preceded the SUPPORT study. In a 1994 review of that literature, David
Orentlicher concluded that physicians are inclined to ignore patient
instructions that do not match their own beliefs about patient welfare. 29 In
a 1992 survey, for example, 31.3% of the respondents stated that the
patient's right to choose was either unimportant or moderately important
21.

See SUPPORT, supra note 1, at 1596. Although the nurses were substantially free to

shape their own role, the physicians were free to limit nurse intervention; however, few did so.
See id. at 1592.
22. See JUDITH AREEN ET AL., LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE 133 (1996) (teachers
manual).
23. See SUPPORT,supra note 1, at 1596.
24. See Lo, supra note 19, at 1635.
25. SUPPORT, supranote 1,at 1596.
26. Id.
27. See id.
28. See id. (finding no success even for subsets of patients or physicians). Not even enactment of the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA) during the pendency of the study improved
outcomes. See id.; see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No.
101-508, §§ 4206, 4751 (Medicare and Medicaid, respectively) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(a)(I)(Q), 1395mm(c)(8), 1395cc(f), 1396a(a)(57), 1396a(a)(58), and
1396a(w) (1994)) (requiring hospitals to inform patients of their right to govern their own
medical care).
29. See David Orentlicher, The Limitations of Legislation, 53. MD. L. REV. 1255,
1281 (1994).
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to decisions about life-sustaining care. Physicians' willingness to comply
also varied with patient prognosis." Because they were most willing to
deviate from instructions when a patient's prognosis was most promising,
these physicians appeared to be substituting their own beliefs about patient
welfare for those of the patient. In a survey of Canadian family physicians
conducted the same year, more than half of the physicians who had personal experience with advance directives said that they did not always follow the directions contained in the directive.33
In a 1989 survey of Arkansas physicians currently engaged in general
practice, 32.4% strongly agreed that "the training and experience of physicians gives them greater authority than patients in decisions about withholding 'heroic' treatment. ' 34 And in a 1993 survey of Rhode Island
physicians, only 59% said they would turn off a respirator of a patient
who had no hope of coming off the respirator and had requested
discontinuation.35
,Not surprisingly, several other recent studies have found that patient
preferences and
patient directives do not affect either treatment patterns or
36
resource use. In fact, the problem persists even when patient wishes are
30. See Panagiota V. Caralis & Jeffrey S. Hammond, Attitudes of Medical Students,
Housestaff, and Faculty Physicians Toward Euthanasiaand Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment,
20 CRITICAL CARE MED. 683, 686 tbl.4 (1992).
31. See id. at 687 tbl.5. While half of the physicians would discontinue ventilator support
for a hypothetical patient with metastatic breast cancer or severe emphysema, less than one third
would do so for a mildly demented elderly woman with pneumonia.
32. See Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 1284.
33. See David L. Hughes & Peter A. Singer, Family Physicians' Attitudes Toward Advance
Directives, 146 CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 1937, 1941 (1992).
34. Kent W. Davidson et al., Physicians' Attitudes on Advance Directives, 262 JAMA 2415,
2416 tbl.3 (1989). Another 16.9% were undecided.
35. See Terri R. Fried et al., Limits of Patient Autonomy: Physician Attitudes and Practices
Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatments and Euthanasia, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 722, 723724 tbl.3 (1993).
36. See Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of the Impact of Patient Preferences on LifeSustaining Treatment and Hospital Cost, 24 CRITICAL CARE MED. 1811 (1996) (presenting a
prospective study of hospitalized patients with a short life expectancy and finding no significant association between a patient's desire to receive treatment to prolong life and either lifesustaining treatment use or hospital costs); Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., Effects of Offering
Advance Directives on Medical Treatments and Costs, 117 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 599 (1992)
(concluding that advance directives had no significant effect on treatments or costs); Teno et al.,
Advance Directives for Seriously Ill, supra note 2, at 500 (finding, after the PSDA, that advance
directives were more commonly noted in the chart (35%), but that less than half of the
physicians were aware of the directives and that presence of the directives did not change the
frequency of DNR orders or attempted resuscitation); Joan M. Teno et al., Do Formal Advance
Directives Affect Resuscitation Decisions and the Use of Resource for Seriously Ill Patients?, 5 J.
CLINICAL ETHICS 23, 27 (1994) (finding, prior to the PSDA, that patients with a living will were
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stated with some specificity. A follow-up study by the SUPPORT investigators in spring 1997 found that treatment decisions deviate from even
specific patient instructions half of the time. 7
Only one major study gives even mild cause for optimism, 3s and that
optimism does not survive close analysis. In a 1991 study of nursing-home
patients, Marion Danis and his co-authors found that 75% of the decisions
made about life-sustaining care were consistent with the patient's living
will.3 9 This hopeful statistic, however, is tempered by the fact that 25% of
the treatment decisions were contrary to patient directives.

Furthermore,

as David Orentlicher points out, the concurrence of patients and
physicians in the other 75% of the cases may simply mean that patient
preferences often conformed with the preferences of their physicians. 4' His
hypothesis that physicians had simply acted on their own medical judgments is supported by the fact that the patients' living wills usually did not
accompany them from the nursing home to the hospital." Moreover, the
presence of a living will in the chart did not increase the odds of complino more likely to have a DNR order entered, DNR withheld, or a different pattern of resource
use). But see Joan M. Teno et al., Preferences for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation: Physician-Patient
Agreement and Hospital Resource Use, 10 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 179 (1995) (finding that both
physician and patient preferences for CPR influenced total hospital resource consumption); cf.
Christopher V. Chambers et al., Relationship of Advance Directives to Hospital Charges in a
Medicare Population, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 541, 541 (1994); William B. Weeks et al.,
Advance Directives and the Cost of Terminal Hospitilization, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2077,
2078 (1994). See generally Edward J. Larson & Thomas A. Eaton, The Limits of Advance
Directives: A History and Assessment of the Patient Self-Determination Act, 32 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 249 (1997) (reviewing the literature).
Other studies have found that discontinuance of life support is almost always undertaken at
the suggestion of the physician, rather than vice versa, which strongly suggests that physicians
control the decision. See David A. Schwartz & Philip Reilly, The Choice Not to Be Resuscitated,
34 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 807 (1986) (finding, in a study of DNR orders, that physicians
raised the issue in 90% of the cases); Nicholas G. Smedira et al., Withholding and Withdrawal of
Life Support from the Critically Ill, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED. 309 (1990) (noting that only 6% of
decisions to terminate treatment in this study of ICUs were initiated by patient or surrogate
requests).
37. See Teno et al., Advance Directives for Seriously Ill, supra note 2, at 508.
38. See Marion Danis et al., A Prospective Study of Advance Directives for Life-Sustaining
Care, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 882 (1991).
39. See id. at 884. This included written directives from patient surrogates.
40. The 25% figure may slightly overstate the actual frequency of deviation from patient
wishes (as distinguished from their written directives), as this figure appears to include two cases
in which the patients changed their minds, and one in which the family changed its mind. See
id. at 886. Also, at least 4 of the 24 cases of deviation from patient wishes reflected less (rather
than more) aggressive treatment than the patient requested. See id.
41. See Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 1281-82.
42. See Danis et al., supra note 38, at 884. The living will was incorporated into the hospital chart in 25 out of 71 hospitalizations. See id.
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ance with patient wishes." As a result, this study provides little reason to
believe that patient preferences are respected when they diverge from those
of the physician.
One other 1995 study also deserves mention. In a study of 114 acute
hospitalizations, all of the study subjects had previously executed advance

directives." Advance directives appeared to influence the treatment decision in twelve of the fourteen cases (86%) in which directives were recognized.45 However, patient directives were recognized by the treating
physicians in only 26% of the admissions involving incapacitated
patients. 46 In the other 74% of the cases, "medical decisions appeared to be
made without consulting the patients' designated proxy or living will."47
Hospitals fare little better than physicians. One study of the Patient
Self-Determination Act found that 40% of the advance directives received
by hospitals were not included in the patient's chart. 4' A more recent 1997
study by the SUPPORT investigators confirmed this indictment of hospital
practices: under ordinary circumstances, only 35% of the advance directives were noted in the medical chart.49
Furthermore, physicians are usually unaware of advance directives
even when they are placed in the chart. In one study, only 26% were
aware and in another only 25%. 50 As a result, investigators have concluded
43. See id. at 885.
44. See R. Sean Morrison et al., The Inaccessibility of Advance Directives on Transfer from
Ambulatory to Acute Care Settings, 274 JAMA 478 (1995). The original patient sample was
drawn from patients with a directive in their outpatient charts. See id. at 482.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 480 (that is, in 14 of 39 admissions).
47. Id. at 481. In 30 of the 39 admissions in which existing directives were not acknowledged, the decisions had input from family members. In none of these cases was the person
making the decision a proxy chosen at the patient's directive. See id. Whenever the physicians
relied on a person who was an authorized proxy, the investigators treated this as recognition of
an advance directive even if the chart contained nothing else to indicate awareness of the directive. See id. at 481. As a result, the study may overstate the incidence of recognition. See
id. Most of the time, the family member consulted was not the patient's designated surrogate.
See id. at 481. The authors place responsibility for the lack of recognition of advance directives
on nursing homes, admitting clerks, physicians, patients, and their families. See id. at 481.
48. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
PATIENT ADVANCE DIRECTIVES: FACILITY AND PATIENT RESPONSES (1993); see also Danis et
al., supra note 38, at 884 (finding that the patient's living will went from the nursing home to the
hospital chart in only 25 of 71 hospitalizations); Morrison et al., supra note 44, at 478.
49. See Teno et al., Advance Directives for Seriously Ill, supra note 2, at 500 (additionally finding that the rate increased to 78% when a nurse was specifically hired to facilitate
communication).
50. See Morrison et al., supra note 44, at 480 (14 out of 39); Teno et al.,
Advance Directives
for Seriously Ill, supra note 2, at 500 (by the second week only one in four physicians was aware of
patient's advance directives).
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that increasing the documentation of existing advance directives does not
improve either patient-physician communication or decision making about
resuscitation."
The current prospects for self-determination are bleak. Cumulatively,
the data suggest a disappointing absence of communication between
patients and physicians, an inexplicable failure by hospitals to place patient
directives in the chart, an inexcusable failure by physicians to familiarize
themselves with available written information about patient preferences,
and even an outright disrespect for patient wishes.52 Furthermore, the failure of the Phase II SUPPORT intervention warns that even a serious effort
to enhance communication that commits as much professional time and
resources as can reasonably be expected may not change established practices at all." In the words of the SUPPORT investigators, "more proactive
and forceful measures may be needed."54

I.

THE LEGAL BACKGROUND

Disrespect for the wishes of patients and their proxies can take the
form of either overtreatment or undertreatment. 5 Each form of misconduct warrants redress. However, each cause of action raises its own
distinct legal issues.5 6 This Article addresses the doctrinal and policy issues
presented when physicians are alleged to have administered unwanted
treatments.
51. ' See Teno et al., Advance Directives for Seriously Ill, supra note 2, at 500 (finding that
increased documentation following enactment of the PSDA did not increase discussions with
patients about resuscitation, DNR orders, or attempted resuscitation); Schneiderman, supra note
36 (finding that patients with and without advance directives were treated the same).
52. See Danis et al., supra note 38, at 882 (noting that physician awareness of patient
wishes did not increase the likelihood that these wishes would be carried out).
53. See SUPPORT, supra note 1, at 1591. "The study certainly casts a pall over any claim
that, if the health care system is given additional resources for collaborative decision making in
the form of skilled professional time, improvements will occur." Id. at 1596.
54. Id. at 1591; accord Robert R. Frank & Margaret L. Campbell, Letter, 275 JAMA
1228 (1996).
55. For findings of undertreatment, see, for example, Alison B. Seckler et al., Substituted
Judgment: How Accurate Are Proxy Predictions?, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 92, 95 (1991); see
also Danis et al., supra note 38, at 886.
56. In routine cases, the negligent or intentional failure to provide life-sustaining care
requested by the patient would support an action for wrongful death. A unique set of policy
issues arise, however, if the physician contends that the requested treatment would have been
"futile." I explored the disability rights issues raised by these futility arguments in an earlier article. See Philip G. Peters, Jr., When Physicians Balk at Futile Care: Implications of the Disability
Rights Laws, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 798 (1997).
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Actions for compensatory damages are the most powerful legal tool
that patients and their families can employ to remedy the harms caused
when physicians disregard their wishes. In the twenty years since the
Quinlan57 case created the modern field of death and dying law, patients
and their representatives have employed a variety of legal theories in their
efforts to recover damages for the administration of unconsented lifesustaining care. Most claims have been brought using tort theories such as
battery, s negligence, 9 informed consent,6° and the intentional infliction of
emotional distress. 6' A few patients have claimed that the unwanted
administration of life support violated their federal civil rights. 6 And some
have sought more limited financial relief, requesting only to escape payment for the unconsented medical services6' or to recover the legal costs of
4
obtaining a favorable court order.
Until recently, these lawsuits were rarely successful.65 By far the most
common obstacle-one extending across all theories of recovery-has been
judicial reluctance to impose liability on physicians and hospitals who
continued life support when they were uncertain about the legal propriety
of ceasing life support. 6
57. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
58. See, e.g., Battling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App.
1986); Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
59. See, e.g., Clark v. Perry, 442 S.E.2d 57 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); Anderson v. St. FrancisSt. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
60. See, e.g., Bartling, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 360; Benoy v. Simons, 831 P.2d 167 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1992).
61. See, e.g., Bartling, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 360; McVey v. Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 524 A.2d
450 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987) (per curiam).
62. See, e.g., Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983); Ross v. Hilltop Rehabilitation Hosp., 676 F.Supp. 1528 (D. Colo. 1987).
63. See, e.g., Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 623 N.E.2d 513 (N.Y. 1993); First
Healthcare Corp. v. Rettinger, 467 S.E.2d 243 (N.C. 1996).
64. See, e.g., Gray v. Romeo, 709 F. Supp. 325 (D.R.I. 1989); McMahon v. Lopez, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 172 (Ct. App. 1988); Bouvia v. County of L.A., 241 Cal. Rptr. 239, 243 (Ct. App. 1987).
65. See ELENA COHEN, 1 BIOLAW, at R:262 (1989) (reporting that no significant damage
awards had been won by patients in the United States); 2 MEISEL, supra note 3, § 17.1, at 352
(same); M. Rose Gasner, Financial Penaltiesfor Failing to Honor PatientWishes to Refuse Treatment,
11 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 499, 505-12 (1992) (same); Robert M. Veatch, Foregoing LifeSustaining Treatment: Limits to the Consensus, 3 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 1, 6 (1993) (same).
However, settlements were reported in two cases. See David H. Miller, Right-to-Die Damage
Actions: Developments inthe Law, 65 DENv. U. L. REv. 181, 197 (1988). Also, a Canadian court
awarded damages of $20,000. See Malette v. Shulman, [19901 D.L.R. 4th 321 (Can.).
66. See, e.g., Foster, 704 F.2d at 1109 (denying attorneys' fees because the hospital's legal
duties were uncertain); Bartling, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 361; Ross, 676 F. Supp. at 1534 (noting that
the law governing the withholding of nutrition was unclear); McVey, 524 A.2d at 450 (refusing
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Not surprisingly, physicians have taken comfort in their de facto
immunity. As Dr. Nancy Dickey, then chairwoman of the board of the
American Medical Association, stated, "The thinking has been that if you
do intervene and you shouldn't have, the worst that will happen is that the
patient will live a little longer and that you'll never be held accountable if
you keep the patient from dying."67
Commentators, however, reasonably assumed that judicial solicitude
for physicians would weaken as the courts more clearly enunciated the circumstances in which life-sustaining treatment could be refused.68 Two factors strongly pointed to that conclusion. First, general principles of tort
69
Indeed,
law ordinarily treat unconsented medical care as a battery.
0 In a
or
beneficial.
unconsented treatment is tortious even if it is harmless
few states, the advance directive statutes also expressly authorize civil
actions.7 Second, the early judicial opinions had emphasized the unfairness of imposing liability on physicians who were forced to make lifeand-death treatment decisions in the face of uncertain and evolving legal
rules. However, these courts did not express any doubts about the propriety
of imposing liability on physicians who had administered unwanted
treatment under circumstances in which the legal authority of the patient
or proxy to refuse consent was clear. Even the Supreme Court appears to
have assumed that battery could lie for the unconsented and unjustified
administration of life support."
to oblige physicians to determine the veracity or effect of the patient's purported oral instructions); Grace Plaza, 623 N.E.2d at 513 (permitting a physician to treat if she "harbors some
uncertainty on the matter" until the issue is legally determined).
67. Lewin, supra note 3, at A28.
68. See, e.g., 2 MEISEL, supra note 3, § 17.1, at 352; MICHAEL H. SHAPIRO & ROY
G.SPECE, JR., CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS ON BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 278 (Supp.
1991); Gasner, supra note 65, at 518.
69.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1965).

70. See, e.g., Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1984); Lacey v. Laird, 139
N.E.2d 25 (Ohio 1956).
18-A, § 5-81 (West Supp. 1995) (authorizing
71. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.
actual damages plus attorneys' fees for intentional violations); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 20-402(1) (Michie 1995) ("Unjustifiable violation of a patient's direction shall be a civil cause
of action maintainable by the patient or the patient's next of kin."); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-7A-I (Michie Supp. 1996) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-1-8(a) (Supp. 1996) ("Any
health care provider who fails to make good faith reasonable efforts to comply with the preceding
procedure as prescribed by the attending physician shall be civilly liable .. );see also UNIF.
HEALTH CARE DECISIONS ACT § 10, 9 U.L.A. 242 (West Supp. 1996) (authorizing actual
damages plus attorneys' fees for intentional violations and adopted in Maine and New Mexico).
72. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (discussing the
common law view that even nonconsensual touching could constitute a battery).

HeinOnline -- 45 UCLA L. Rev. 685 1997-1998

686

45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 673 (1998)

Now a second generation of unconsented care cases is testing this
hypothesis.73 Some have resulted in sizable jury awards-$500,000 in one
reported instance 4 and $16.5 million in another." Given the empirical
evidence that physicians routinely ignore advance directives, the emergence of these cases is certainly not surprising. Indeed, one reported motivation for these suits is "a desire on the plaintiffs' part to effect a change in
the culture of medicine. 7 6
However, the fate of future lawsuits has been placed in serious jeopardy by a doctrinal obstacle whose power was not fully appreciated by the
first generation of courts and commentators. That obstacle is the similarity
that these lawsuits bear to wrongful life claims: both actions seek damages
for unwanted life. In a wrongful life action, a child seeks damages from a
provider whose negligence has resulted in the child's conception or birth. 7
In the typical action for unwanted life support, the patient seeks damages
for being kept alive against her wishes.18 In both actions, life and its associated burdens are the harms alleged. 9 In wrongful life cases, the courts
have been troubled by the policy implications of this allegation. In particular, they have worried that recognition of a claim based on the
harmfulness of life would be inconsistent with respect for life. They have
also harbored serious doubts about the calculability of damages for this
73. See supra note 3.
74. In San Francisco, a jury reportedly awarded a family of Jehovah's Witnesses $500,000
for giving a three-year-old child blood transfusions against parental wishes during a kidney
transplant. See SHAPIRO & SPECE, supra note 68, at 328 (citing Transfusion Dispute Nets Family
$500,000, ARIZ. Bus. GAZETTE, Apr. 20, 1990, at 28).
75. See Osgood v. Genesys Reg'I Med. Ctr., No. 94-26731-NH (Mar. 7, 1997) (reducing
the judgment from $16.5 million to under $2 million). The case was then reportedly settled.
76. AREEN ET AL., supra note 22, at 135 n.20; see also Lewin, supra note 3, at A28.
77. See PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 370 (5th
ed. 1984).
78. In rare circumstances, the action may not turn on the unwanted extension of life. For
example, unconsented life-sustaining care, such as chemotherapy, could actually shorten the life
of some patients. Samuel Oddi gives the example of transfusing a patient with incompatible
blood. See A. Samuel Oddi, The Tort of Interference with the Right to Die: The Wrongful Living
Cause of Action, 75 GEO. L.J.
625, 641 (1986) (noting that wrongful death damages would be the
measure of damages). In other cases, unwanted life-sustaining care may be improperly performed,
inflicting unnecessary injuries that make the patient's life more painful or difficult. In that
event, ordinary personal injury damages would provide the remedy.
79. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996); see
also William C. Knapp & Fred Hamilton, "Wrongful Living": Resuscitation as Tortious Interference
with a Patient's Right to Give Informed Refusal, 19 N. KY. L. REV. 253, 258 (1992); Adam A.
Milani, Better off Dead Than Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a "Wrongful Living" Cause of
Action When Doctors Fail to Honor Patients' Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 149,
222 (1997).
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alleged harm. As a result, almost all courts have rejected wrongful life
cases.8° The same fate could await actions for unconsented life support.
Surprisingly, the wrongful life analogy received little serious judicial
1
or scholarly
82 attention until the past year. Instead, both courts and commentators focused on the other doctrinal and policy issues raised by
claims for unwanted life support. Although Samuel Oddi used the phrases
"wrongful living" and "wrongful prolongation of life" in 1986 to describe
actions for unconsented life support, 3 the wrongful life analogy itself was
typically overlooked altogether,' 4 dismissed summarily,85 or else mistakenly
treated as inconsequential. Until autumn 1996, no court or law review
80. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.2, at 662 (2d ed. 1993); Philip G. Peters, Jr.,
Rethinking Wrongful Life: Bridging the Boundary Between Tort and Family Law, 67 TUL. L. REV.
397, 400-02 (1992). Only three states clearly permit some recovery, and they limit recovery to
the extraordinary costs associated with the child's birth defects. See infra text accompanying
note 143.
81. Prior to 1996, the only state to address the wrongful life analogy was Washington-one
of the three states permitting partial recovery in wrongful life actions. See Benoy v. Simons, 831
P.2d 167, 170 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992). That case refused to recognize a new action for "wrongful
prolongation of life;" it rejected the wrongful life analogy because the breaches of duty in the two
types of cases differ.
82. See infra text at notes 84-86.
83. See Oddi, supra note 78.

84.

See, e.g., David H. Miller, Right-to-Die Damage Actions: Developments in the Law, 65

DENV. U. L. REV. 181 (1988); Steven 1. Addlestone, Note, Liability for Improper Maintenance of
Life Support: Balancing Patientand PhysicianAutonomy, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1255 (1993).
85. See, e.g., Richard P. Dooling, Comment, Damage Actions for Nonconsensual LifeSustaining Medical Treatment, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J. 895, 916-18 (1986); see also Gasner, supra
note 65, at 511 n.83 (distinguishing the cases because unconsented care cases do not involve an
allegation that the plaintiff would never have existed but for the tortious conduct); Knapp &
Hamilton, supra note 79, at 258 (acknowledging that both actions pose the same value question,
but distinguishing the wrongful life cases on the grounds that they lack a decision by the patient
before the fact); Oddi, supra note 78, at 641 n.75 (suggesting that only wrongful life actions
require a comparison between life and nonlife).
In an interesting variation, one student note relies on the similarity to build a case for partial
recovery, but fails to explain why the analogy will not doom the action altogether in the great
majority of states that reject wrongful life actions. See Tricia Jonas Hackleman, Violation of an
Individual's Right to Die: The Need for a Wrongful Living Cause of Action, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1355,
1364-73 (1996).
86. See 2 MEISEL, supra note 3, § 17.17, at 401 (suggesting that rejection of a "wrongful
living" cause of action "would work no hardship on the plaintiff in terms of establishing liability"
because the plaintiff would continue to have claims for battery or negligence); see also Willard H.

Pedrick, Dignified Death and the Law of Torts, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 387, 390 (1991) (suggesting
that an action would still lie in battery). Recent critics of a wrongful living cause of action
have made the same error. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225,
228 (Ohio 1996); Milani, supra note 79, at 223. For a discussion, see infra text accompanying
note 218.
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article had seriously explored either the appropriateness of the wrongful life
analogy or its full implications.
In autumn 1996, the Ohio Supreme Court decided Anderson v. St.
Francis-St. George Hospital, Inc."s Anderson involved the treatment of
Edward Winters, a competent and alert eighty-two year old with multiple
health problems, including two previous heart attacks and chronic heart
disease. Dismayed by death-prolonging treatments that had been given to
his wife, he instructed his physician to withhold extraordinary life-saving
measures in the event of further illness. A "no code blue" order was placed
in his chart. On May 28, 1988, Mr. Winters suffered ventricular tachychardia. Despite the "no code" order, he was resuscitated by shocking his
heart with an electric current. Two days later, he suffered a stroke that
paralyzed his right side. Before his death two years later, he sued the hospital for battery, negligence, and "wrongful living" because the hospital had
failed to respect his wish not to be resuscitated. 9
Although the Ohio Supreme Court conceded that Mr. Winters's physicians were legally required to comply with his directions, 90 it denied him
recovery on the grounds that the prolongation of his life was not a compensable injury.9' "There are some mistakes, indeed even breaches of duty," it
concluded, "for which there simply should be no monetary compensation." 92 In reaching this conclusion, the court quoted from prior wrongful
life opinions in which it had both "recognized 'the impossibility of a jury
placing a price tag' on the benefit of life," 93 and also "disapproved of
awarding damages on the relative merits of 'being versus nonbeing."'94
However, the court did suggest that providers would be liable in battery for
any damages "directly" caused by unwanted treatment, such as tissue burns
or broken bones. 95
In spring 1997, in Osgood v. Genesys Regional Medical Center,96 a
Michigan trial court joined Anderson in endorsing the wrongful life anal87. In 1993, however, Norman Cantor did note the analogy. See
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF DEATH WITH DIGNITY

NORMAN CANTOR,

133 (1993).

88. 671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996).
89. See Anderson v. ADMR, 614 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ohio 1992).
90. See St. Francis-St. George, 671 N.E.2d at 227.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 228.
93. Id. (quoting Johnson v. University Hosp. of Cleveland, 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1378
(Ohio 1989)).
94. Id. (quoting Bowman v. Davis, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 n.3 (Ohio 1976))
95. Id.at 229.
96. No. 94-26731-NH, at 11, 15 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Mar. 7, 1997) (Opinion/Order as to defendant hospital's post-judgment motions).

HeinOnline -- 45 UCLA L. Rev. 688 1997-1998

Unconsented Life Support

689

ogy. Because Michigan courts reject claims for wrongful life, the trial court
held that "Michigan does not recognize a claim premised on medical
treatment which is alleged to be wrongful solely because it results in continued 'living." '97 On that basis, the court reasoned that the plaintiff was
entitled only to nominal damages and medical expenses,98 and the court
therefore reduced a jury award of $14,837,400 in compensatory damages to
$324,900. It also allowed the patient's mother to recover $1,108,000 under
an analogy to a wrongful birth claim. 99 The case was settled without
appeal.
In addition, a 1997 law review article by Professor Adam Milani draws
heavily on the wrongful life analogy for its arguments opposing recognition
of a "wrongful living" cause of action.'0° Professor Milani opposes actions
for wrongful living because: (1) they would harm the interests of disabled
persons; (2) they require a decision about the harmfulness of life that courts
cannot handle and that is antithetical to the value placed by the law
on human life; (3) they require an impossible calculation of damages; and
(4) there are adequate remedies available under traditional tort law.01° He
would, however, permit a battery action for the recovery of extraordinary
expenses caused by the patient's extended life.'0 2
Is the wrongful life analogy sound? Only partially. Although the endof-life cases are, of course, similar to the wrongful life cases in their contention that life itself is a compensable injury, they also differ in important
respects. In the wrongful life setting, for example, courts have worried that
they would offend public policy if they endorsed allegations made by legal
representatives of an unplanned child that the child would have been better off unborn.'0 3 At the end of life, on the other hand, public policy
clearly supports the right of patients and often their proxies to refuse lifeextending care. As a result, a reasonable argument can be made that
redressing the violation of those rights would neither offend public policy
nor constitute a repudiation of the value of life. Furthermore, the calculation of damages may be less daunting at the end of life than at conception
because jurors have the concrete deliberations of the patient or proxy to
guide them, and because they can more readily place themselves in the
shoes of the patient approaching death than in the shoes of a child who
97. Id.
at 11.
98. See id. at 15.

99. See id. at 18-19.
100.
101.
102.
103.

See Milani, supra note 79.
See id.
at 154.
See id. at 223-27.
See infra text accompanying notes'106-111.
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allegedly would have been better off unborn. These distinguishing factors
make the public policy and calculability concerns less powerful at the end
of life. In addition, wrongfully resuscitated patients lack the financial
protections that wrongful birth actions provide for wrongfully conceived
children. As a matter of both corrective justice and deterrence, therefore,
wrongfully resuscitated patients more crucially need an action of their own.
The analogy is imperfect in other respects as well. For example, the
exposure to tort liability for unconsented life support could conceivably
make physicians hesitant to render emergency care in some settings, a danger not precisely mirrored in wrongful life cases. Moreover, patients and
families who wish to terminate heroic efforts may be able to seek injunctive
relief (rather than damages), a remedy not available to the child bringing a
wrongful life case. Consequently, the unconsented care cases force us to
ask whether equitable remedies should be preferred to legal ones, thereby
reversing the usual presumption favoring legal redress.' 4 Less obviously,
the unconsented care cases also invite us to consider whether compensatory damages should be available in a more narrow range of cases than
those eligible for equitable relief.' °5
These differences make reflexive borrowing of the wrongful life analogy inappropriate. Instead, actions for unconsented care warrant a thorough and independent analysis of their own.

III.

RESPECTING THE VALUE OF LIFE

In the wrongful life cases, many courts have been deeply troubled by
the contention that life itself is a legally compensable harm. They feared
that recognition of wrongful life actions by disabled children would be "a
repudiation of the value of human life."'1' "[Tihe courts of this State,"
wrote the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, "should not become involved
in deciding whether a given person's life is or is not worthwhile."'0 7 In the
eyes of the law, continued the court, all lives have equal value. Similarly,
the Supreme Court of Illinois believed that "[sluch a disavowal of life
offends society's deeply rooted belief that life, in whatever condition, is
more precious than nonexistence."' 1c8 This perspective led the North
Carolina Supreme Court to conclude that "life, even life with severe
104. See DOBBS, supra note 80, § 1.1, at 3.
105. This topic is discussed in Part VI. Redefining the substantive right in light of the
requested remedy would deviate from traditional practice. See id. § 1.1, at 1-2.

106. Blake v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315, 321 (Idaho 1984).
107.
108.

Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 314,352 (N.H. 1986).
Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 702 (Ill. 1987).
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defects, cannot be an injury in the legal sense."' 9 Many other courts have
reached the same conclusion,110 at times implying that recognition of the
cause of action would threaten societal respect for persons with severe
disabilities.I"
Actions seeking damages for unconsented life support are potentially
vulnerable to the same objections. Here, too, the plaintiff contends that
life and its burdens are harmful."' Consequently, it is not surprising that
the Ohio Supreme Court borrowed language from wrongful life opinions to
support its conclusion that the prolongation of life cannot be a legal detriment." 3 Despite the superficial similarity, however, courts should resist the

temptation to borrow the language and reasoning of the wrongful life cases
without reflecting upon the quite different circumstances and perspectives
that inform the law of death and dying.
At the end of life, state courts and legislatures have already made the
crucial policy decision that the prolongation of life is not always a blessing.
They have come to terms with the reality that some life-sustaining treat-

ments are more burdensome than beneficial and that patients and their
families, not physicians, should make these decisions. Although courts still
acknowledge that the state has an interest in the preservation of life," 4

they routinely conclude that this interest is outweighed by the patient's
right to decide."'
Competent and previously competent patients have a virtually abso-

lute power to refuse life-sustaining care." 6 Most states also permit proxies
109. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 532 (N.C. 1985).
110. See, e.g., Blake, 698 P.2d at 322 ("To recognize wrongful life as a tort... is completely
contradictory to the belief that life is precious."); Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 702 ("[Tlhe public
policy.., to protect and to preserve the sanctity of all human life ... militates against the judgment that an individual life is so wretched that one would have been better off not to exist.");
Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635, 642 (Kan. 1986) ("[W]hether the person is in perfect
health, in ill health, or has or does not have impairments or disabilities, the person's life is valuable, precious, and worthy of protection.").
111. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 537, 543 (D.S.C. 1980); Berman v. Allan,
404 A.2d 8, 12-13 (N.J. 1979).
112. See, e.g., Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 228
(Ohio 1996).
113. See id.
114. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 1978); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J.
1985); 1 MEISEL, supra note 3, §§ 2.4-.5.
115. See, e.g., Satz, 362 So. 2d at 160; In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987); 1 MEISEL,
supra note 3, § 2.4, at 51-52 ; 2 MEISEL, supra note 3, § 8.2, at 468-70.
116. See 2MEISEL, supranote 3, § 10.9, at 22; § 10.11, at 24; § 11.1, at 82 (commenting that
almost all states have living will statutes and that advance directives are enforceable in other
states even without legislation); id. § 10.11, at 23 (noting that states lacking statutory authority
for living wills allow health care powers of attorney).
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such as family members, guardians, and persons appointed under a durable
power of attorney to make that decision when the patient's wishes are not
known."'
The distinction between end-of-life cases and wrongful life cases is
most apparent when the patient has personally directed that life-sustaining
For obvious reasons, wrongful life cases contain no
treatment cease.
equivalent exercise of patient autonomy. The sanctity of life argument is,
therefore, qualitatively weaker in the end-of-life cases. Autonomy also
distinguishes those cases in which a patient has personally chosen the
proxy she wishes to make decisions about her life-extending care.
The analogy to wrongful life is stronger, however, when the treatment
decision is made by a proxy who has neither been chosen by the patient
nor received clear guidance from the patient. In the many states that
permit proxies to make decisions under these circumstances,1 9 the treatment decision cannot be characterized as an exercise of the patient's
autonomy. Superficially at least, these third-party decisions about the
value of continued life-sustaining care resemble decisions made by parents
to avoid the birth or conception of a child whom they fear will have birth
defects.
Despite this similarity, however, proxy decisions about life-sustaining
care are quite different. First, parents making a decision whether or not to
conceive are not necessarily making a decision that the future child would
be better off dead. As a result, juries evaluating wrongful life claims are
forced to make that assessment on their own. By contrast, decisions at the
end of life reflect a family member's heartfelt belief that further life support
would be contrary to the patient's best interests.
Second, it seems incongruous to authorize families to make decisions
that end a patient's life and enforce those decisions with injunctive relief
while simultaneously maintaining that compensatory damages would
offend public policy. Courts regularly enforce the decision-making power
117. See 1 MEISEL, supra note 3, § 7.7, at 371 (describing how most states permit patient representatives, like guardians, family members, and other proxies, to make decisions for incompetent patients even if there is no clear and convincing directive from the patient, using a

substituted judgment standard); id. § 12.4, at 133 (noting that all states except Alabama have
legislation authorizing patients to appoint proxies); id. § 14.1, at 249 (observing that states are
beginning to enact surrogate decision-making statutes).

118.

See Walker by Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz.

1990) (en banc)

("Children ... have neither the ability nor the right to determine questions of conception, ter-

mination of gestation, or carrying to term."); Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 79, at 258.
119. See 1 MEISEL, supra note 3, §§ 7.12-.13, at 395-405.
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of patients and their proxies with declaratory and injunctive relief. 20
These judicial orders result in death. Certainly, the threat to respect for
life posed by recognition of a damages action is trivial compared to the
impact of a judicial order terminating life-extending care. From this perspective, both kinds of relief are defensible because each gives substance to
the legal rights of patients and their proxies. This conclusion is clearest in
2
states whose advance directive statutes explicitly authorize civil liability,1 1
but it also seems reasonable in states whose legislation is silent on the issue
of liability.
However, opponents of recovery are likely to point out that courts can
award equitable relief without directly participating in the underlying
treatment decision. Instead, courts need only enforce the decision of the
patient or proxy. Suits for damages, on the other hand, require the judicial
factfinder to decide independently whether the unwanted extension of life
was harmful. Unless the damages calculation is restricted in some fashion
(as explored in Part V),' the factfinder must then place a dollar value on
the harm.
This difference between equitable and legal relief has already been
noted in the wrongful life cases. In Smith v. Cote,'23 for example, the court
distinguished wrongful life actions from right-to-die cases because the former requires an objective calculation of harm by the court whereas the latter does not. "[Tihe courts of this State," it reasoned, "should not become
involved in deciding whether a given person's life is or is not worthwhile."'24 In right-to-die cases, by contrast,
[t]the court avoids making an objective judgment as to the value of
the plaintiffs life; it strives, instead, to protect the individual's sub-

jective will. Even when the plaintiff is an incompetent, "the court
does not arrogate to itself the individual's choice," but instead allows
the plaintiffs
guardian or surrogate to make that choice on his
25
1

behalf.

In a wrongful life case, the court continued, a court must determine
"whether legal injury has occurred."'126 Courts, it said, "have no business
120. See supra note 117; see also Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 487 N.E.2d 626
(Mass. 1986); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Ct. App. 1986).
121. See supra note 71.
122. See infra text accompanying notes 210-237.
123. 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986).
124. Id. at 352.
125. Id. (citations omitted).
126. Id.
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declaring that among the living are people who never should have been
born." ' 7 This difference between equitable enforcement and compensatory
redress has led one commentator to conclude that the right-to-die cases
protect individual dignity while the wrongful life cases offend it.'
This argument insightfully identifies a genuine factual difference
between equitable and legal remedies. However, the normative conclusion
that the court draws from it, in my view, is mistaken. To be sure, courts
awarding damages cannot wash their hands of the underlying treatment
decision. But the significance of that involvement is minor when compared with judicial willingness to recognize and enforce a right to refuse
life-sustaining care. Judicial orders providing equitable or declaratory relief
lead to a person's death; damages do not. These orders have far more symbolic and practical significance than an award of damages, and they do far
more to destroy the legal presumption that all life is beneficial. Although
calculating damages involves courts more deeply in the burden-benefit calculus than most rulings about equitable relief, it seems foolish to suggest
that damages calculations have even a fraction of the societal significance
of judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing a right to die.
Furthermore, judicial rulings on requests for equitable relief often
involve the court quite deeply in an "objective" evaluation of the treatment decision. 9 Judicial supervision of proxy decisions for error or abuse
inescapably requires judicial monitoring of the treatment decision itself,
especially when the patient's probable wishes are unknown and the treatment decision is based on the patient's best interests."°
It is easy to understand the desire of judges to affirm the worth and
sanctity of "less-than-perfect life.' 3 Nevertheless, this desire does not
provide a sufficient basis for rejecting the actions of patients who are kept
alive against their wishes. When unconsented care is administered, the
patient, not the court, suffers the agony of prolonged death, the impover127.

Id.
at 353.

128.

See Patrick J.Kelley, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Birth, and Justice in Tort Law, 1979 WASH.

U. L.Q. 919,938-39.
129. Professor Milani notes the potential in these equitable cases for abuse of disabled
patients. See Milani, supra note 79, at 203-15. He suggests that this bias provides a reason to
reject damages actions for unconsented life support. But the cure for judicial abuse in cases
seeking equitable relief is better decision making, not rejection of an action for damages.

130. See 1 MEISEL, supra note 3, §§ 7.12-13, at 395-405.
131. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982).
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ishment of further medical and support expenses, and the frustration and
indignity of lingering beyond her time and burdening her family. Only an
action for damages will fully redress these injuries, protect the financial
welfare of the patient, and deter future misconduct.3 "
Injunctive relief is not likely to be an adequate substitute. For many
patients, the need for injunctive relief will not become apparent until the
damage has been done.'33 For others, a restriction to equitable relief would
place the burden of litigation on patients and their families, most of whom
will be unsophisticated about legal matters, many of whom will lack
resources to litigate, and all of whom will be struggling with a family medical crisis. In addition, only damages will deter future misconduct. Under
these circumstances, well-intentioned presumptions about the value of life
should yield to the legitimate requests of wrongfully treated patients for
redress.
To summarize, a crucial factor distinguishing many unconsented care
cases from all wrongful life cases is the dying patient's personal exercise of
autonomy. This factor definitively distinguishes those end-of-life cases in
which the patient has articulated her preferences regarding treatments or
proxies. Even in those cases in which the patient's wishes are unclear,
many states have authorized proxies to make treatment decisions on the
patient's behalf. When proxies properly exercise this authority, their decisions are enforceable with injunctive relief. Under those circumstances, it
stretches credulity to suggest that enforcement of these decision-making
rights with compensatory damages offends public policy. To be sure, judges
and juries will be obliged to ratify the treatment decision. But that is quite
similar to enforcing a treatment decision with equitable or declaratory
relief. After all, those remedies lead to the death of the patient.
In truth, both our law and our social norms support the freedom of
patients and their proxies to make these decisions.'
Enforcing their
wishes will send a message that patient rights must be respected, not a message that other patients with a similar prognosis must decline care.
132. In Part V, I explore the suggestion that the wrongfully treated patient's recovery should
be limited to extraordinary support costs, similar to the parental recovery allowed in wrongful
birth actions. See infra text accompanying notes 210-237.
133. One irony of rejecting recovery is that the loss of deterrence could increase the number
of patients who might seek physician-assisted suicide as a way of mitigating their injury.
134. See 1 MEISEL, supra note 3, § 1.5, at 12-13 (reviewing surveys finding popular sentiment favorable to the rights of patients and their families to refuse some forms of life-sustaining
care).
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IV. CALCULATING DAMAGES
Under traditional tort analysis, a plaintiff seeking compensatory damages must prove that she has been harmed by the defendant's tortious conduct."' Although a plaintiff who can prove intentional misconduct can

recover nominal 136 and sometimes even punitive damages"' without any
proof of harm, she cannot recover compensatory damages without this proof.
To meet this burden, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's misconduct has made her worse off than she would have been "but
for" the tort.'38 In an action for unconsented life support, the patient must
prove that she would have been better off if she had been allowed to die.
This comparison between life and death is likely to trouble the courts, just
as the comparison between life and nonexistence troubled the courts faced
with wrongful life claims.
In the wrongful life cases, courts assumed that the child bringing the
action would have to prove that her life was worse than never existing at
all. Many of them also believed that it would be logically impossible or, at
least, beyond human capacity to compare life with "the utter void of nonexistence."'39 Justice Weintraub of the New Jersey Supreme Court
expressed his concerns in this way:
Ultimately, the infant's complaint is that he would be better off not
to have been born. Man, who knows nothing of death or nothingness, cannot possibly know whether that is so .... To recognize a

right not to be born is to enter an area in which no one could find
his way.140

In another much quoted paragraph, Judge Jasen of the New York
Court of Appeals stated the problem in this way:
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have
been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to
See, e.g., Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT
§ 903, at 453 (1965).
136. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 cmt. b; see also KEETON ET AL.,
135.

(SECOND) OF TORTS

supranote 77, § 9, at 40.

137. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmrt. c; see also KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 77, § 9, at 40.
138. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 957 (Cal. 1982); KEETON ET AL., supra note 77,
§ 41, at 266.
139. Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 692 (N.J. 1967); see also Stewart v. Long Island
College Hosp., 296 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44-45 (1968), modified, 313 N.Y.S.2d 502 (App. Div. 1970); G.
Tedeschi, On Tort Liability for "Wrongful life," 1 ISR. L. REV. 513, 529 (1966); Bonnie Steinbock,
The Logical Case for "Wrongful Life," HASTINGS CENTER REP., Apr. 1986, at 15, 17-18.
140. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 711 (Weintraub, C.J., dissenting in part).
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be left to the philosophers and the theologians. Surely the law can
assert no competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view of the
very nearly uniform high value which the law
and mankind has
141
placed on human life, rather than its absence.
Because of the difficulty of the task, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court doubted that wrongful life claims could be resolved in a reasonable,
even-handed, and fair way. Instead, it feared "markedly disparate and,
42
hence, unpredictable outcomes.'
Indeed, even the three states that allow partial recovery in wrongful
life actions have refused to allow general damages. 43 Instead, they have
limited recovery to the extraordinary expenses associated with the child's
birth defects.' 44 In Turpin v. Sortini,145 for example, the California Supreme
Court concluded that "it would be impossible to assess general damages in
46
any fair, nonspeculative manner.'
The same objection has now been directed against actions seeking
damages for unwanted life support. 14 However, there are several reasons
why courts should not assume that damages in cases of unconsented life
support exceed the jury's capacity. First, factfinders do not need to compare life with death in order to calculate damages. Instead, the jury need
only compare the benefits of extended life with the burdens. That is a
more manageable assignment and it has some analogs in existing practice.
Second, the expressed wishes of the patient and her proxy can inform the
jury's determination of harmfulness; no equally probative evidence is available in a wrongful life case. Third, the jurors' ability to empathize with the
patient's predicament may enable them to calculate damages more fairly
than they could calculate damages for a child who claims that she should
never have been born. Fourth, defendants who have forced unwanted
"benefits" upon a patient are in a weak position to insist that the patient's
cause of action be dismissed if the benefits officiously conferred are difficult
141.

Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. 1978).

142.
143.

Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 353 (N.H. 1986).
See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982); Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755 (N.J.

1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1983).
144. See Turpin, 643 P.2d at 961-64; Procanik, 478 A.2d at 760-64; Harbeson, 656 P.2d at
494-97. By permitting this recovery without a determination that the child has been harmed by
being born, the courts exposed themselves to criticism that they were unprincipled. See infra text
accompanying notes 224-237 (discussing this charge).
145. 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982).
146. Id. at 963-64.
147. See, e.g., Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 228 (Ohio
1996); Milani, supra note 79, at 221-22.
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to measure. Finally, our limited judicial experience with these cases does
not justify a fear of wild or irrational verdicts.
A.

Balancing Burdens and Benefits

Although judicial doubts about the damage calculus in wrongful life
cases have been eloquently expressed and are undoubtedly sincere, they
overstate the problem. Life need not be compared to death to determine if
the prolongation of life is harmful. Instead, the harmfulness of an
unwanted life-extending treatment can be ascertained by comparing the
48
benefits conferred by the prolongation of life to the harm that it inflicts.
No knowledge of death or nothingness is necessary to perform this calculation. This knowledge was not necessary for the patient or her proxy when
making the treatment decision and it is not necessary for the jury when
determining damages.
All personal injury cases require the jury to speculate to some extent
about the harm caused to the plaintiff. Alexander Capron notes that
"jurors can never actually experience a plaintiff's life in its 'normal' state
before an injury or in the injured state that resulted from a defendant's
actions.' '' 49 Thus, juries must always use their imaginations to evaluate the
burdens suffered by the plaintiff. The amount of imagination required
grows with the severity of the injury. We tolerate this speculative leap in
order to provide redress for a proven wrong."o
Wrongful treatment cases would take this task a step further. In cases
alleging unconsented life support, the emotional, physical, and financial
148. Numerous articles make this point in the context of wrongful life claims. See, e.g.,
Michael D. Bayles, Harm to the Unconceived, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 292 (1976); Nora K. Bell &
Barry M. Loewer, What Is Wrong with "Wrongful Life" Cases, 10 J.MED. & PHIL. 127, 138 (1985);
Joel Feinberg, Wrongful Life and the Counterfactual Element in Harming,4 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 145,
158-59, 161-67 (1986); Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in "Wrongful Life" Actions, 42
HASTINGS L.J.
505, 518 n.58 (1991); see also Philip G. Peters, Jr., Protecting the Unconceived:
Nonexistence, Avoidability, and Reproductive Technology, 32 ARIZ. L. REv. 488, 502 (1989). This
is true whether nonexistence is assigned a utility of zero or is assigned no utility at all. See id. at
502 n.83 (collecting citations). Because courts lack knowledge about the patient's afterlife, if
any, they cannot make assumptions about a patient's fate in the hereafter. Instead, it seems reasonable to view death (or nonexistence) as a state with an unknown value. See id. at 502; see
also Kelly, supra, at 518 n.58. When patients and their proxies have chosen to make a decision
based on the information that they do have about the benefits and burdens of heroic care, it
seems reasonable for courts to honor this choice and use a similar calculus.
149. Alexander Morgan Capron, Tort Liability in Genetic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618,
658 (1979).
150. Indeed, fears of bias would probably lead most attorneys to exclude from the jury a
potential juror who had actually suffered the same injury as the plaintiff. See Knapp &
Hamilton, supra note 79, at 270-71.
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burdens of prolonged life in a debilitated state must be compared to the
benefits of a longer life. The first part of this calculation poses no unique
difficulties. Adducing the burdens suffered by the patient due to the prolongation of life, such as continued pain and financial loss, should be a
straightforward task for tort juries. However, calculating the benefit of
being kept alive appears to be a novel assignment.'
Nevertheless, even
this task has analogs in existing practice.
Juries routinely place a value on the benefits of life in ordinary tort
cases. They do so whenever the defendant's conduct has deprived the
plaintiff of pleasures, such as reading, recreation, or interacting with family. 52 What distinguishes the unauthorized treatment cases, consequently,
is not the need to place a monetary value on the pleasures of life, but the
way in which this valuation is used to compute damages. In routine tort
cases, the jury adds the value of any lost pleasures to the plaintiffs award.
In unauthorized treatment cases, however, juries must subtract the value of
the benefits conferred upon the plaintiff from the plaintiffs award.'53 As a
result, the mathematical use of these values differs, but the underlying
project of assigning values to the benefits of life is surprisingly similar.
B.

Standing in the Patient's Shoes

The task of calculating damages in the unconsented care cases is also
made more manageable by the jury's ability to draw upon their own family
and community experiences with end-of-life decision making. That shared
experience will better enable them to stand in the shoes of the patient.
While few of us would seriously question whether we should have been
born, most of us have watched relatives die and all of us understand that
our own time will come. With that knowledge, we can anticipate and
empathize with decisions that patients make about their own life-sustaining
151. See Kelly, supra note 148, at 518, 526 (making this point regarding wrongful life
actions).
152. See, e.g., Thompson v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 824-25 (6th Cir.
1980); Yosuf v. United States, 642 F. Supp. 432, 438-42 (M.D. Pa. 1986); Kenton v. Hyatt
Hotels Corp., 693 S.W.2d 83, 97 (Mo. 1985); DOBBS, supra note 80, at 653; Annotation, Loss of
Enjoyment of Life as a Distinct Element or Factor in Awarding Damages for Bodily Injury, 34
A.L.R.4th 293 (1984).
153. Some courts may feel that this methodology is flawed because life has an intrinsic value
that is greater than the sum of its parts. These courts may phrase their objections to recovery as
concerns about the calculability of damages. In my view, however, this is really a sanctity of life
objection to recovery, not an objection to the jury's capacity to calculate the harm actually
experienced by the patient. If, as suggested above, the sanctity of life presumption must yield in
cases of unconsented life support, then the actual experiences of the patient should serve as the
basis for the damages calculation.
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care. Wrongful treatment cases, therefore, allow the judge and the jury to
draw on their own experiences with illness, agini, death, and the withholding of life-sustaining medical care.
C.

The Value of Patient and Proxy Preferences

In an action for unconsented treatment, the jury's task is aided by
their knowledge that the patient or her proxy felt certain enough about the
harmfulness of the unwanted treatment to forego the chance of a longer
life."5 4 No equally probative evidence of harmfulness is available in
wrongful life cases. A parent's decision not to conceive a child or even to
abort a fetus does not reliably reflect a belief that the future child would be
better off dead. When parents make reproductive decisions in advance of
conception or during the early part of pregnancy, they are free to make it
on any ground, including their emotional and financial resources and their
hope of having or adopting another child without birth defects. Under
these circumstances, one cannot assume that the parents who chose not to
conceive have concluded that any future child's life would be worse than
death. Furthermore, choosing not to conceive a child is simply not the
same decision as letting a living person die.'
Indeed, the wrongful life
cases themselves illustrate this difference; they are pursued on behalf of
children whose parents have chosen not to let them die.
Admittedly, a jury hearing an unconsented care case must still
determine whether the patient has suffered as badly as she feared she
would. And the jury will have to place a value on the harm, if any, that it
believes occurred. But the jury's ability to perform this task should be
enhanced by the context in which it is asked to do it.
D.

Unclean Hands and Limits on Offset

To reach the issue of damages, the patient must prove that the defendant has violated the patient's rights and that the plaintiff has suffered as a
result. If the plaintiff can meet this burden, then it seems reasonable to
assign to the tortfeasor, rather than the plaintiff, the burden of proving that
the tortious conduct also contained some benefits. If those benefits are too
154. See DOBBS, supra note 80, § 1.9, at 37 n.26 (recommending deference to the subjective
valuations of the plaintiff if this can be done without unfairness to the defendant and so long as
practical proof so permits).
155. For a further exploration of the difference, see Peters, supra note 148, at 536-47.
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speculative or difficult to calculate, then the resulting failure of proof
should rest on the shoulders of the defendant, not the plaintiff.'56
Courts already allocate the burden of proof this way in ordinary tort
actions. In Morris v. St. Paul City Railway Co.,157 for example, the plaintiff
suffered a miscarriage due to the defendant's negligence. The defendant
claimed that she had been spared the pain of childbirth. The court refused
to take this "benefit" into account because the benefit was too speculative.15s Courts could handle unconsented care cases in a similar manner,
permitting the cause of action to proceed as long as the harms suffered by
the plaintiff are properly proven and giving the defendant credit only for
the pleasures of life that are similarly proven.
In fact, a plausible argument can be made that unwanted benefits
should not be considered at all, especially if the provider has intentionally
ignored the patient's instructions. Under the rules governing restitution,
for example, reimbursement is not ordinarily required for benefits bestowed
against the recipient's wishes. 5 9 This rule reflects the belief that individuals should not be forced to accept and pay for benefits that they do not
want.'6 While the recipient may have been enriched,
that enrichment is
6
not regarded as unjust under the circumstances. 1
Tort law is not as harsh on defendants. In tort, the defendant's liability can sometimes be reduced to reflect benefits tortiously conferred upon
the plaintiff. Nevertheless, significant restrictions are placed on this process to protect against injustice. Section 920 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts permits offset only if the defendant has conferred a benefit similar
156.. See Kelly, supra note 148, at 520 ("To deny recovery because the defendant cannot
produce exculpatory evidence seems backwards."); Melinda A. Roberts, Distinguishing Wrongful
from "Rightful" Life, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 59, 69 (1990). Kelly acknowledges that
a child may enjoy some benefits from life. See Kelly, supra note 148, at 518. But, he suggests
that: (1) these "unwanted" benefits should not be "thrust" upon the child; (2) to the extent that
these benefits are uncertain and are hard to compare against the (more certain) losses, the party
that seeks to benefit from them should bear the burden of proof and the consequences of failure
of proof; (3) benefits should only be offset against losses to the same interest; and (4) the benefits
rule should not apply to child support. See id. at 519-25.
157. 117 N.W. 500 (Minn. 1908).
158. See id. at 502.
159. See DOBBS, supra note 80, § 4.9, at 467; John W. Wade, Restitution for Benefits Conferred
Without Request, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1183 (1966); see generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION
§§ 2, 112, 116(c) (1937) (recommending restitution for emergency care only if "the person supplying [services to prevent bodily harm or pain] had no reason to know that the other would not
consent to receiving them, if mentally competent"); id. § 114 cmt. b, illus. 7 (precluding compensation for services rendered against a patient's religious beliefs).
160. See DOBBS, supra note 80, § 4.9(2), at 470.
161. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 2 cmt. a.
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to the harm she has caused and only if doing so is equitable. 6 ' According
to comment b, "Damages resulting from an evasion of one interest are not
diminished by showing that another interest has been benefited."' 63 Thus,
damages for the pain caused by an unconsented surgery may be reduced to
reflect any future relief from pain resulting from the surgery. 64 However,
damages for the patient's pain and suffering are not diminished by proof
that the surgery has increased the patient's earning capacity. 165 This
restriction on offset attempts to minimize the risk of an unfair windfall to
the plaintiff while66 protecting the plaintiff from a forced trade for an
unwanted benefit.
The compromise approach reflected in section 920 should probably be
applied to disputes over unconsented life support. An absolute refusal to
take officiously conferred benefits into account would often be unfair to
defendants. It would permit plaintiffs whose extended lives have brought
joy or financial windfalls to recover damages for harm that they have not
suffered. 67 Refusal to offset would also add an unnecessary chill to the
"'chilling effect" that liability could produce on emergency decisions and
would be inconsistent with the public policy of acknowledging the benefits
of life. However, the defendant should bear the burden of proving any
162. The Restatement (Second) of Torts states the rule as follows:
When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that
was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages,
to the extent that this is equitable.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920.

163. Id. at cmt. b.
164. See id. at illus. 1.
165. See id. at cmt. b, illus. 6.
166. See id. at cmt. f. The good or bad faith of the defendant also plays a role in the extent
of offset. See Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905), overruled on other grounds by
Genzel v. Halvorson, 80 N.W.2d 854 (Minn. 1957) (permitting the jury to consider the "good
faith" of the defendant along with the beneficial nature of the unconsented ear surgery). Comment f to section 920 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts also confirms that good faith matters.
It states that
when a person has land or chattels that he has devoted to a particular purpose, he is
entitled to continue to use them for that purpose, and the person who interferes with
the use is not entitled to have damages mitigated by the fact that he has added to their
market value. In these cases the good faith, and reasonableness of the attitudes, of the
parties are factors in determining the measure of recovery.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. f.
167. Because of the risk of windfall, offset is ordinarily permitted in cases involving unconsented care that is not life sustaining. See Maben v. Rankin, 358 P.2d 681 (Cal. 1961); Mohr,
104 N.W. at 12; Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96 (Okla. 1913).
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purported benefits, and offset should be limited to like interests. 68 In cases
like Anderson, therefore, a jury calculating intangible harm should be permitted to consider the gratitude that Mr. Winters had expressed to the
nurse who resuscitated him and the many visits and outings that he had
with his family.' 69 But these intangible benefits should not be used to
reduce recovery of his medical expenses. In addition, courts performing
this calculus should recognize a separate interest in self-determination that
is not subject to offset by other intangible benefits.170 This would permit a
Jehovah's Witness, for example, to recover a reasonable award for the violation of her religious beliefs, even if she has suffered neither net financial
loss nor pain and suffering.'
The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act
endorses this approach and suggests a minimum award of $500 for intentional misconduct, but that figure is far too low.'
E.

Past Jury Verdicts

Although only a few jury verdicts have been reported in the years
since the Quinlan case created the field of death and dying law, they do not
provide any basis for concluding that trial judges and juries are unable to
reach defensible verdicts. Instead, they reveal intuitively sound differen168. Limitations on offset are desirable for another reason as well. The physician who keeps
a patient alive unwillingly is morally responsible for the continued life of the patient and, consequently, has a responsibility (much like that of parents who bring children into the world) to
share in the financial support of the patient. That moral obligation justifies a legal duty to help
support the unwittingly resuscitated patient if doing so is necessary for the humane care of the
patient. See Kelly, supra note 148, at 521-25 (suggesting that support expenses should not be
subject to offset); Peters, supra note 80, at 435-37 (suggesting a duty to share in all expenses that
exceed the parents' ability or obligation to pay). Consequently, a physician's liability for proven
economic harm should not be reduced to reflect any intangible benefits conferred. However,
courts may wish to consider any collateral sources of support available to the patient in deciding
whether to reduce the physician's liability for economic harm.
169. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 226-28 (Ohio
1996).
170. Several scholars have proposed a similar "dignitary tort" to protect patients whose right
to informed consent has been violated. See Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge Between

the Idea of Informed Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 210,
211-14 (1988); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of
Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 655; Alan J. Weisbard,
Informed Consent: The Law's Uneasy Compromise with Ethical Theory, 65 NEB. L. REV. 749, 76364(1986).
171. See, e.g., Malette v. Shulman, [19871 D.L.R. 4th 18 (Can.) (awarding $20,000, which
was affirmed on appeal).
172. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 10, 9 U.L.A. 258-59 (Supp. 1997). New
Mexico substituted a $2500 minimum award. See id. at 259.
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tiations between those cases in which a small sum should be given, such as
cases in which the only harm inflicted was the violation of patient autonomy, and those cases in which unmistakable suffering resulted or especially
egregious misconduct occurred.
In Malette v. Shulman, 73 for example, a Canadian court awarded
$20,000 in general damages to a Jehovah's Witness whose instructions not
to administer blood transfusions had been ignored. Because the treatment
might have saved her life and the treatment had not impaired her hope for
eternal salvation, the trial court limited her recovery to damages for her
mental distress. The appellate court found that her $20,000 award was
within "the range of damages appropriate to a tortious interference of this
nature."'74 In a similar case in California, the Atlanta Journal reports that
175
the jury was more generous, awarding $500,000.
Some cases have been resolved by settlement or dismissal. In Leach
v.Shapiro,'76 for example, a suit was brought on behalf of a woman with
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis ("Lou Gehrig's disease"). She had told her
physicians not to keep her alive by machines.' Nevertheless, she was kept
on a respirator after suffering a cardiac arrest and remained alive in a
persistent vegetative state. Her physician refused to disconnect her
respirator, contending that it would be murder. He persisted in his refusal
even after the family had obtained a court order permitting the termination
of life support. 7 Eventually, the family located an out-of-town doctor and
waited for him to be granted hospital privileges so that he could disconnect
the respirator.'79 They then sued the hospital and the unwilling physician.
The hospital reportedly settled prior to trial for $50,000. Thereafter, the
trial court dismissed the patient's action against the physician for lack of
sufficient evidence on the issue of informed consent and damages to her
family."s
173.
174.
175.

[1987] D.L.R. 4th 18 (Can.).
Malette v. Shulman, [1990] D.L.R.4th 321,339 (Can.).
Mark Curriden, Jehovah's Witness Sues Hospital After Transfusion, ATLANTA J.,
June 19,

1990, at Dl; see also SHAPIRO & SPECE, supra note 68, at 328 (citing Transfusion Dispute Nets
Family $500,000, ARIZ. Bus. GAZETTE, Apr. 4, 1990, at 28 (discussing an unconsented blood
transfusion to a child during a kidney transplant)). That award was being appealed at the time of
the report.
176. 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
177. See id.
178. See Akron Doctor Goes on Trial in "Right to Die" Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1985, at
A17; Judge Clears Doctor Who Refused Death Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1985, at A24.
179. See Judge Clears Doctor Who Refused Death Plea, supra note 178, at A24.
180. See id. If the issue was noneconomic harm to the patient, a reasonable argument can be
made that vegetative patients suffer neither harm nor pleasure from life. Cf. McDougald v.
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A claim was also dismissed for lack of damages in Foster v.
Tourtellotte." 1 In that case, a competent patient had withdrawn consent to
his respirator and had asked for medications to comfort him prior to his
death. The veterans hospital in which he was being treated refused to
remove the respirator, citing concerns about complicity in suicide and
objections by his wife and son.18 2 Sixteen days later, he suffered a heart
attack and entered into a coma. Within twenty days he was brain dead.
At trial, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the question of damages.8 3
In Galvin v. University Hospital of Cleveland,' 4 Mr. Galvin had
checked into the hospital because of heart problems. He told his physicians that he did not want heroic efforts made to resuscitate him. Nevertheless, he was resuscitated using electric shock after he had an irregular
heartbeat. After he was stabilized, he checked himself out of the hospital
against medical advice and died at home a short time later. At the trial,
the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.
The startling award of damages occurred in 1996 in Osgood. The
plaintiff, Brenda Young, had been diagnosed with abnormal blood vessels
in her brain that were causing seizures. She had been warned that her seizures would eventually become so severe that they would leave her profoundly disabled. As a result, she had given her mother a power of attorney
to terminate health care if she became incapacitated.'
After her next seizure, she went into a coma. The jury concluded that her physicians then
lied to her mother in order to get her mother's initial consent to heroic
care. I1 6 As a result, Brenda was kept alive against her wishes. During the
four years that elapsed prior to trial, Brenda "spent her days in torment,
rhythmically screaming and thrashing in her mother's home.' ' . 7 Although
she occasionally managed a few intelligible words, like "water" or "bury
me," mostly she screamed for five or six hours at a time. Her father was
unable to cope and left the home after thirty years of marriage. No convalescent home would take her, so her mother shouldered the burden of
Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372 (N.Y. 1989) (refusing to permit an unconscious plaintiff to recover damages for the lost enjoyment of life).
181. 704 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
182. Seeid. at 1110.
183. See id.
184. No. 115873 (Ohio Ct. of Com. Pleas, filed Sept. 8, 1986), summarized in Miller, supra
note 65, at 197.
185. See Lewin, supra note 3, at 1.
186. See Osgood v. Genesys Reg'l Med. Ctr., No. 94-26731-NH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Mar.
3, 1997).
187. Lewin, supra note 3, at 1.
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caring for her alone. The jury awarded Brenda, by then thirty-eight years
old, nearly $15 million and her mother over $1 million. The trial court
reduced Brenda's award to $325,000 (her anticipated future medical
expenses) because it would not permit her to recover general damages for
the prolongation of life.'
These cases provide significant evidence that juries and the courts
supervising them can manage the task of calculating damages in these
cases. Indeed, trial judges may be too hesitant to give the issue to jurors.
Only the jury award in Osgood stands out as a possible exception, and its
combination of deceit and unimaginable, long-term suffering suggest that
the jury got it right. Furthermore, even if that case is considered an outlier,
there is no reason to believe from the overall pattern of outcomes that
excessive verdicts are more common for these cases than for other torts or
that they are less amenable to judicial control.
The more likely problem with damage awards is that they will be
small.8 9 They will be small because most patients, unlike Brenda Young,
will be old and critically ill and may not be conscious of any suffering. In
that event, the awards for compensatory damages may be too small to serve
as an effective deterrent. Punitive damages could help correct this in the
most egregious cases.190
F.

Summing Up Calculability

The task of calculating general damages in cases of unconsented life
support will be more difficult than it is in traditional tort cases because
juries must place a value on the benefits of prolonged life. As a result,
courts and commentators can reasonably ask whether the jury is capable of
calculating damages fairly. However, there are several reasons to believe
that juries will be able to do so. First, the presence and severity of any
harm done to the patient can be determined by balancing the benefits of
prolonged life against the burdens. Knowledge of death or nonexistence is
not needed. Second, jurors will be able to call on both their own experiences and also the considered decisions of the patients and their families to
help them make reasoned judgments. No equivalent information is available in wrongful life cases. Third, the only aspect of the damages calculation that will be novel is the measurement of life's benefits, an issue on
which the tortfeasor, not the patient, should bear the burden of proof and
188. See Osgood, No. 94-26731-NH.
189. See 2MEISEL, supra note 3, § 17.1, at 352, § 17.25, at437.
190. See infra text accompanying notes 216-218.
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suffer the consequences of failure. In addition, those benefits should be offset only against the pain and suffering of prolonged life, not the pecuniary
costs. Finally, our limited experience with these cases does not support the
speculation that juries and the supervising trial judges cannot reach defensible verdicts. In fact, the small size of jury verdicts is likely to make punitive damages an important tool for deterring the most egregious
misconduct.
V.

CORRECTIVE JUSTICE

As the ethicist Robert Veatch has observed:
If competent patients have a valid moral and legal right to refuse
medical treatment, it stands to reason that they should have some
recourse if they are treated against their consent. Real harms are
incurred ....

Patients suffer physical pain ....
91

Hospital bills will still

have to be paid.'

Basic fairness requires that physicians who usurp the legal decisionmaking power of patients or their legally authorized proxies compensate
those patients for any harm caused by their misconduct. Assuming that
damages can be calculated and that doing so is consistent with public policy (assumptions that I have tried to defend in Parts III and IV), then justice mandates compensation.19'
However, several judicial and academic critics of a cause of action for
unconsented life support have suggested that the goals of just compensation and deterrence can be adequately advanced even if courts reject an
action for full compensatory damages. Instead, they propose that courts
recognize a battery action for limited damages, such as the extraordinary
expenses caused by the prolongation of life. Although a compromise of
this sort would be preferable to a denial of recovery altogether, partial
recovery would be decidedly inferior to general damages as a matter of both
justice and deterrence. Given the weaknesses in the arguments against full
recovery, that sacrifice would be inappropriate.
191. Veatch, supra note 65, at 6.
192. Liability would also advance the compensation goals of tort law by shifting the losses to
a party better able to spread the costs. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 77, § 4, at 24-25;
Hackleman, supra note 85, at 1371. It would also place responsibility on the least cost avoiderthat is, the party best positioned to insure that patient and proxy wishes are respected. See
generally Guido Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055 (1972) (proposing a strict liability test "to accomplish a minimization of the sum of
accident costs and of accident avoidance costs").

HeinOnline -- 45 UCLA L. Rev. 707 1997-1998

708

45 UCLA LAW REVIEW 673 (1998)

Compensation for Wrongful Treatment

A.

All states currently have legislation recognizing in some form a right
to refuse life-sustaining care.' Courts have extended this right even further. In fact, the preeminent treatise in the field characterizes the right of
currently competent patients as "virtually absolute."' 94 Every state also
permits proxies to refuse life-sustaining care for incompetent patients under
some circumstances, although the precise requirements for doing so vary
widely. 9'
States confer this decision-making power on patients in order to
protect patient autonomy. They confer decision-making power on proxies
to protect patient welfare. These interests in autonomy and welfare are
jeopardized whenever physicians disregard the instructions of patients and
their legally authorized proxies.
The law of battery protects patients against this harm by making
unconsented treatment actionable.' 96 Indeed, under the law of battery, the
patient is entitled to recover nominal damages whether or not the
treatment is harmful and to receive punitive damages if the misconduct is
egregious.' 97 Not surprisingly, several state statutes regulating advance
directives specifically contemplate a civil action for damages. 9 And the
Uniform Health Care Decisions Act contemplates a minimum recovery to
insure that the injury to autonomy and dignity is compensated even if the
treatment is otherwise beneficial. 99
Failure to enforce these rights with an action for damages would leave
injured patients uncompensated, no matter how catastrophic their suffering
193.
194.

See Hackleman, supra note 85, at 1355, 1361.
1 MEISEL, supra note 3, § 2.4, at 51. It also concludes that incompetent patients have a

nearly absolute right to have appropriate medical decisions made on their behalf. See id. § 2.4, at
54.
195. See id., at ch. 7 (surveying the standards by which courts permit surrogates to make
treatment decisions for incompetent patients).
196. Most of the current cases allege battery as the underlying breach of duty. Traditionally,
a physician commits a battery whenever she performs a medical procedure without the patient's
consent, unless the treatment is rendered in an emergency and it is impossible to obtain consent.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 15, 892-892D cmt. a, illus. 4 & 5, cmt. b. The
consent can be either actual (subjective) or apparent (objective). See id. §§ 49-50. As a matter
of traditional tort law, the emergency treatment exception disappears when the physician knows
in advance that consent has been refused. See id. § 892D cmt. a, illus. 5; see also Malette v.
Shulman, [19901 D.L.R. 321 (Can.) (holding that the emergency doctrine of necessity does not
allow a physician to disregard a patient's advance directive); Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469
N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
197. See supra notes 136-137.
198. See supra note 71.
199. See supra note 172.
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nor how much they depend upon tort recovery to pay the medical and support expenses engendered by the unwanted care. As between the patient
who has been wrongfully kept alive and the physician who has wrongfully
administered the treatment, corrective justice would certainly seem to
require that the physician compensate the patient for any harm caused by
the breach of duty.
Furthermore, an independent action for damages is more important to
a wrongfully treated patient than a wrongful life action is for a child who is
conceived due to provider negligence. The welfare of wrongfully conceived children is partially protected by judicial recognition of parental
actions for wrongful birth. Through their wrongful birth actions, parents
can recover the extraordinary costs of raising a child with a disability2°°
and, in some states, their ordinary child support costs as well.0' This
indirect protection of the child makes recognition of an independent
wrongful life action in the name of the child less essential. The supreme
courts of New Hampshire and Arizona, for example, both explicitly noted
that "recognition of a wrongful life action would make a substantial difference only in limited circumstances, as when the statute of limitations bars
the parents' claim.., or when the parents are unavailable to sue. ' '
Several factors make it unlikely that courts will recognize an
equivalent cause of action at the end of life.20 3 Most importantly, the
harms suffered by the wrongfully treated patient and her family arise out of
a breach of duty to the patient, not to the family. In wrongful birth
actions, by contrast, the physician breaches a duty owed first to the
parents.' 04 As a result of this difference, a cause of action by family
members for compensatory damages more closely resembles a bystander
claim for the negligent infliction of emotional distress or, more rarely, a
claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, than it resembles
a wrongful birth action. Not surprisingly, that is how many of the family
200. See, e.g., Fassoulas v. Famey, 450 So. 2d 822, 824 (Fla. 1984) (allowing recovery of
extraordinary upbringing costs); James G.v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872 (W. Va. 1985).
201. See Phillips v. United States, 508 F. Supp. 544 (D.S.C. 1981); Ochs v. Borrelli, 445
A.2d 883 (Conn. 1982); KEETrON Er AL., supra note 77, at 372-73.
202. Walker by Pizano v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 740-41 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc); Smith v.
Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 354 (N.H. 1986).
203. But see Osgood v. Genesys Reg'I Med. Ctr., No. 94-26731-NH, at 18-19 (Mich. Cit.
Ct. Mar. 3, 1997) (analogizing the mother's action for the value of her care to a wrongful birth
claim).

204. See, e.g., Walker, 790 P.2d at 740 (stating that "any wrong that was done was a wrong
to the parents, not the fetus"); Morgan v. Olds, 417 N.W.2d 232, 235-36 (Iowa App. 1987)
(noting that physicians owe the patient a duty to seek proxy consent, but not the family); Young
v. Oakland Gen. Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 321, 326 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (same).
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claims have been litigated.0 5 So characterized, they face substantial
doctrinal obstacles. 0 6 Furthermore, these actions do not entirely sidestep
the policy issues presented by a claim that life is harmful. As Adam Milani
points out, resolution of these claims requires that the benefits to the
family from the patient's survival be compared to the burdens.0 7
Parents of minor children and spouses may be entitled to sue in their
own name for reimbursement of any of the patient's expenses that they
have been required to pay under the "necessaries" doctrine.' °8 However,
other family relationships will not give rise to either the obligation to pay

or the right to reimbursement. Furthermore, this doctrine does not make
the wrongdoer responsible for financial costs incurred personally by the
patient or her insurer. Nor does it compensate the patient for the
intangible harm done to the patient. Accordingly, wrongfully treated
patients need a cause of action in their own name.
The fairness of imposing liability in particular cases will, of course,
depend upon the facts of the case.2O Courts will have to determine, for
205. See Ficke v. Evangelical Health Sys., 674 N.E.2d 888, 893 (111.App. Ct. 1996)
(rejecting an action by the family because extending such an action to bystanders would raise
serious practical problems, such as where to draw the line); Benoy v. Simons, 831 P.2d 167, 170
(Wash. 1992) (denying recovery because the plaintiff had not proven intent or recklessness,
extreme and outrageous conduct, or objective physical injury); 2 MEISEL, supra note 3, § 17.6
(reviewing the cases and the doctrinal requirements).
206. See supra note 205.
207. See Milani, supra note 79, at 225 n.355.
208. See, e.g., Hulse v. Warren, 777 S.W.2d 319 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989); St. Joseph Hosp. v.
Rizzo, 676 A.2d 98, 100 (N.H. 1996).
209. The most compelling claim for damages will arise when a health care provider knowingly disregards clear patient preferences in a case that presents no unique legal issues. A powerful claim for recovery will also arise whenever an advance directive is contained in the patient's
chart and the patient's nurse or physician unreasonably fails to read it. See Oddi, supra note 78,
55
at 661 n.16 0 ; see also Milani, supra note 79, at 225-26 n.3 (supporting liability, but for
a hospital negligently fails to
when
also
arise
will
for
recovery
claims
expenses only). Strong
place a patient's advance directive in the chart. See id. (concluding that liability "may encourage
better record-keeping practices"). Congress's enactment of the PSDA, imposing certain obligations on hospitals for the handling of patient advance directives and for educating staff about
patient rights, might even provide a basis for alleging that the hospital's conduct was negligent or
even negligent per se. See Gasner, supra note 65, at 518-19; Addlestone, supra note 84, at 127879; but see Asselin v. Shawnee Mission Med. Ctr., 894 F. Supp. 1479, 1485 (D. Kan. 1995)
(finding no private cause of action for violating the PSDA). Liability would also be appropriate
when a physician disregards the clear instructions of a legally authorized surrogate.
In other cases, the fairness of allowing recovery will be less clear. In the past, for example,
courts have been protective of physicians who continued to treat because the law governing their
legal obligations was unclear. See, e.g., Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 623 N.E.2d
513, 514-15 (N.Y. 1993) (refusing to authorize relief from hospital bills despite an earlier ruling
that the evidence of Mrs. Elbaum's wishes was adequate); compare Battling v. Superior Ct., 209
Cal. Rptr. 220 (1984) (ruling posthumously that the patient's wishes should have been honored),
with Bartling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 229 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App. 1986) (denying

HeinOnline -- 45 UCLA L. Rev. 710 1997-1998

Unconsented Life Support

711

example, whether the physician reasonably believed that consent had been
given, or whether the physician had a legally sufficient basis for providing
treatment over the objections of the patient or proxy. 0 But in those cases
in which the physician has neither consent nor a legally sufficient justification for treatment, the fairness arguments for allowing the recovery of
compensatory damages are powerful.
B.

Partial Recovery

The courts and scholars who oppose recognition of a cause of action
for the prolongation of life are not convinced that patients need a cause of
action for full compensatory damages. In their view, patients can receive
sufficient protection with an action for limited damages. Under one
approach, the patient would only recover damages for injuries "directly"
inflicted by the unwanted treatment. Under a second approach, patients
would only recover the extraordinary expenses that they incur due to the
prolongation of their lives.
The first of these approaches was proposed in Anderson. In that case,
the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that unwanted life-saving treatment
would not go undeterred because the provider would be liable for any damages "directly" caused by the battery, such as "tissue bums or broken
bones," resulting from an unwanted defibrillation."'
damages for unwanted medical treatment). Deciding the fairness of liability under these circumstances ultimately requires a decision whether physicians or families should be obliged to initiate
judicial proceedings when they disagree. This question is discussed further in Part VI.
210. Adherence to moral or religious scruples is one justification that may be offered. Many
state living-will statutes and a few judicial opinions permit providers to transfer the patient if the
withholding of life-sustaining care would violate their moral beliefs. See 2 MEISEL, supra note 3,
§ 11.18, at 112-13, § 17.23, at 420-26. However, moral crises do not appear to be the typical
explanation for overuse of life support. Instead, physicians seem to assume that they know what
is best for their patients. See, e.g., Danis et al., supra note 36, at 1815 (noting that physicians
assume that patients share their views). As a consequence, they either fail to acquaint themselves with patient wishes or they ignore what they have learned. Even in those occasional cases
in which a physician's resistance arises out of genuine moral qualms, the physician should'be
required to give timely notice to the patient of the physician's moral objections so that the
patient's family can quickly locate another provider. In addition, the physician should cooperate
with transfer of the patient. The Uniform Health Care Decisions Act would impose these
requirements of notice and assistance. See UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 7, 9 U.L.A.
236 (Supp. 1997). Failure to do so should deprive the physician of this defense to tort liability.
211. See Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hospital, Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ohio
1996) (noting that Winters had no damages due to defibrillation). Although Winters suffered a
stroke subsequent to the resuscitation, the life-saving efforts had not precipitated the stroke
except by prolonging his life. The court felt this distinction was crucial. See id. The trial court's
opinion in Osgood appeared to follow Anderson on this issue. See Osgood v. Genesys Reg'l Med.
Ctr., No. 94-26731-NH (Mich. Cir. Ct. Mar. 7, 1997).
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The second method of limiting damages would permit patients to
recover the extraordinary expenses caused by the prolongation of life. That
is the same measure of damages used in the minority of states that permit
wrongful life actions."' Professor Milani, who opposes actions for general
damages, has endorsed the recovery of extraordinary expenses."' And the
trial court in Osgood also concluded that the patient's medical expenses
were compensable even though her wrongful living claim was not.214 This
also may be the remedy contemplated in Alaska, where the living will statute authorizes the recovery of $1000 plus the costs incurred due to the
wrongful conduct. 5
Because partial recovery of this kind is possible, Professor Milani has
concluded that direct recognition of an action for wrongful living is unnecessary. "Courts need not take on the task of deciding whether a plaintiff's
life is worth living," he writes, "because there are adequate remedies available under familiar tort principles for those whose refusal of life-sustaining
care has not been honored."1 6 Patients, he suggests, can bring battery
actions for their extraordinary expenses." ' This, he concludes, would satisfy "the basic rule of tort compensation" and would provide adequate
deterrence.218
These proposals for partial recovery contain two important similarities. First, they share the assumption that patients who are treated against
their wishes should receive some recovery. The significance of that concession cannot be overstated. It markedly differentiates the debate over
unconsented life support from the debate over wrongful life. In the
wrongful life setting, the great majority of courts rejected the cause of
action altogether. Thus far, no court or commentator has suggested a
similarly draconian resolution of damages actions for unconsented life support. As a result, the axis of the debate at the end of life is quite different
than it was in the reproductive torts. In the wrongful life setting, the
debate ultimately was between limited recovery and none at all. With
actions for unconsented life support, however, the current debate is
212. See supra text accompanying note 144. In addition, most states permit parents to
recover the extraordinary costs of caring for a child born due to provider negligence in a wrongful birth action. See supra text accompanying note 200.
213. See Milani, supra note 79, at 228; see also Hackleman, supra note 85, at 1369
(advocating the recovery of extraordinary expenses).
214. See Osgood, No. 94-26731-NH, at 15.
215. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.070(a) (Michie 1996).
216. Milani, supra note 79, at 228.
217. See id.
218. See id. at 226, 228. It would also be consistent with the protections provided by
wrongful birth actions. See id. at 225.
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between partial recovery and full recovery. Although future judicial opinions may retreat from this concession, the current tenor of the debate is
notably more receptive to claims by wrongfully treated patients. This
difference is probably explained by the many factors that differentiate the
two settings (explored above in Parts III and IV), including the absence of
a wrongful birth analogy in end-of-life disputes." 9
The second similarity between these proposals is the shared assumption that wrongfully treated patients would have an action for battery even
if their "wrongful living" claims were dismissed. This assumption is likely
to cause a regrettable amount of unnecessary confusion. The thorny issues
posed by unwanted life support turn on the damages requested, not the
precise breach of duty alleged to have caused them. In this sense, William
Knapp and Fred Hamilton are correct when they suggest that "[there is no
more a 'cause of action' for 'wrongful living' than there is a cause of action
for a 'wrongful broken leg' or a 'wrongful whiplash..'.2 0 To recover compensatory damages for harm caused by unwanted treatment, a patient must
prove both a traditional breach of duty, such as battery or negligence, and
the presence of compensable harm. The difficult issues are raised by the
harm or damages alleged, not by the theory of recovery; recasting the theory of recovery will not avoid these damages issues.
Despite this unfortunate detour, the proposals for limiting damages do
have an important potential advantage. A properly fashioned limitation
on damages has the potential to sidestep or minimize judicial concerns
about respect for life and the calculability of damages. However, only one
of the two proposed ways of shaping a partial recovery fulfills this promise.
And both proposals are vulnerable to the criticism that they inadequately
compensate wrongfully treated patients.
The first proposal would distinguish between injuries "directly" caused
by tortious life support and those that are merely a product of the prolongation of life. This approach does not survive close scrutiny. If an
unwanted life-saving treatment is competently performed"' and successfully extends the patient's life, 2 then recovery for injuries inflicted during
219. See supra text accompanying notes 200-208.
220. Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 79, at 261; see also Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George
Hosp., Inc., 671 N.E.2d 225, 227 (Ohio 1996) (using the same examples as Knapp & Hamilton).
221. If incompetence results in a worse recovery than should have occurred, then the patient
would have an ordinary negligence claim for the unnecessary injuries.
222. If an unwanted life-sustaining treatment causes extra pain or injury and yet fails to
extend the patient's life (as might occur with unwanted chemotherapy), then the patient has a
traditional action for unnecessary pain and suffering, not for the unwanted extension of life. See
Oddi, supra note 78, at 641 n.76 (giving the example of a transfusion with incompatible blood).
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the resuscitation raises precisely the same issues as any other claim for
wrongful living. Contrary to the assumptions of the court, these issues are
not escaped when the post-resuscitation suffering results from injuries
inflicted during the resuscitation itself. If the alternative to life with these
injuries was death, then the patient has not been harmed by their infliction
unless the benefits conferred by the prolongation of life are outweighed by
the burdens. The fact that the patient's suffering results from injuries
inflicted during life-saving care, rather than during the weeks or months
thereafter, is irrelevant. As a result, courts cannot escape the controversial
implications of a claim for wrongful life support by limiting recovery to the
injuries "directly" inflicted during life support.
In addition, the distinction between direct and indirect harm has
another shortcoming. It would arbitrarily favor the patient who deteriorates during the course of resuscitation over both the patient whose
condition was catastrophic at the time of resuscitation and also the patient
who foreseeably deteriorates after resuscitation. 223 Because the distinction
between direct and indirect injuries does not withstand analysis, most
courts will probably reject it.
The second proposal would permit wrongfully treated patients to
recover only the extraordinary costs that they suffer by virtue of the
unwanted treatment. The two most powerful potential criticisms of this
measure of recovery are, first, that it provides inadequate compensation
and deterrence and, second, that it represents an unprincipled compromise.
While the first of these criticisms is accurate, the second is not. As a
result, recovery of pecuniary harm represents a respectable second-best
remedy--one that should be considered in those jurisdictions unwilling to
allow full recovery.
The most damning weakness of partial recovery is its inadequacy.
Restricting recovery to extraordinary pecuniary expenses would unfairly
undercompensate both those patients who endure tragic physical and emotional suffering and also those patients, like Jehovah's Witnesses receiving
unwanted blood transfusions, whose primary grievance is their loss of
autonomy or religious liberty. In addition, restriction of recovery to
extraordinary expenses would leave unprotected those patients whose welfare requires assistance with the ordinary expenses of their prolonged lives,
including shelter, food, and clothing. Contrary to Professor Milani's
contention, truncated relief of this kind is not consistent with traditional
223. When the patient's subsequent deterioration is unforeseeable, traditional proximate
cause notions could limit recovery.
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notions of tort recovery, which seek to make the injured person whole. 24
Compensating wrongfully treated patients this parsimoniously is simply not
necessary given the weaknesses in the arguments against full recovery.
Nevertheless, some courts are likely to reject full recovery. In those
states, recovery of either extraordinary pecuniary expenses or, more generously, both extraordinary and ordinary pecuniary expenses offers a promising second-best remedy." 5 So limited, the calculation of damages will be
relatively simple and the court will not need to determine the ultimate
value of the patient's extended life. Although damages will be incomplete,
partial recovery will provide patients with some protection against financial catastrophe and will give physicians some incentive to respect patient
wishes. In this way, a limited right to recovery would protect these patients
in much the same way that a parental wrongful birth action protects children born due to provider negligence. Consequently, it is far superior to
denial of the claim altogether.
The second criticism likely to be advanced against partial recovery is
one that was leveled against the courts that allowed partial recovery in
wrongful life cases. In those cases, partial remedy was immediately criti226
cized as internally inconsistent by both advocates and critics of recovery.
As Roger Dworkin noted, "It seems odd to ...admit simultaneously that
an injury has been inflicted on the child while denying full compensation
for it.""2 7 From this perspective, partial recovery was inadequate. On the
other hand, the Texas Supreme Court viewed this compromise as too generous. In its view, courts allowing partial recovery were discarding the
requirement of a legally cognizable injury in order to reach the "right
result." ' The primary deficiency of this compromise, said the New Hampshire Supreme Court, is "that it imposes liability even if the defendant has
caused no harm.2 2 9
Despite these criticisms, however, partial recovery is a defensible outcome in states that conclude that general damages are incalculable. As
224. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 & cmt. a (stating that damages are
intended to restore the plaintiff to the position he would occupy "but for" the tort); DOBBS, supra
note 80, § 8.1, at 647 (noting that compensatory damages seek to compensate the plaintiff for all
losses, including pain and suffering).
225. See Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 79, at 269 n.87 (citing cases allowing extras as a
minimum recovery).
226. See Peters, supra note 80, at 403 nn.14-15 (collecting authorities).
227. Roger B. Dworkin, The New Genetics, in 1 BIOLAW 89, 98 (1986).
concurring); accord
228. Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 930 (Tex. 1984) (Robertson, J.,
Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Colo. 1988) (en banc).
229. Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 354 (N.H. 1986); accord Walker by Pizano v. Mart, 790
P.2d 735, 740 (Ariz. 1990) (en banc).
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explained above,2 30 the elements of damages that are hardest to calculate
are the intangible benefits and burdens of life itself, not the extent of
pecuniary harm. Courts that decline to permit recovery for intangible
harm because they doubt the jury's ability to ascertain such damages may
reasonably conclude that the presence or absence of pecuniary harm is
In effect, the intangible
demonstrable and, therefore, compensable.
benefits and burdens of life will be treated as offsetting one another.
Although, as Melinda Roberts correctly points out, this approach may
overcompensate children with minor birth defects whose lives were clearly
beneficial on balance and undercompensate those children with the most
catastrophic injuries,"' the presumption seems reasonable in jurisdictions
that doubt their ability to perform the larger calculation.
This compromise is also consistent with the rules governing officiously
conferred benefits. 232 Tort law traditionally takes them into account only
to reduce damages for harms to a similar interest. 233 This restriction helps
to minimize the risk that the defendant will be able to force an unwanted
trade upon the plaintiff, while at the same time limiting the risk of a
windfall to the plaintiff. 24 In the context of unconsented life support, this
approach supports the recovery of damages for pecuniary harm even if the
unwanted treatment confers intangible benefits on the patient.
Recovery of pecuniary losses can also be defended by analogy to the
laws of child support. The physician who keeps a patient alive against the
patient's wishes has effectively breathed new life into the patient and, like
a parent who brings a child into the world or a physician whose carelessness results in the birth of a child, this physician has a moral responsibility
to protect the well-being of that patient during the patient's extended
life. 2" This obligation does not require proof that the patient's extended
life is harmful; 3 6 instead, it arises out of the physician's disrespect for the
patient's wishes and his resulting responsibility for the welfare of that
230. See supra text accompanying note 151.
231. See Roberts, supra note 156, at 70.
232. See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965-66 (Cal. 1982).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 162-172.
234. Interestingly, this rule limits the extent to which the law of damages is strictly consequentialist or utilitarian in nature. For a further discussion of the nonconsequentialist underpinnings of this approach, see Peters, supra note 148, at 524-34.
235. For an elaboration of this thesis in the context of wrongful life actions, see generally
Peters, supra note 80. Under current family law, child support obligations may arise out of contract, consent, and some kinds of tort-like misconduct, in addition to genetic parenthood. See id.
at 425-29.
236. See id. at 398-99.
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patient. In the wrongful life setting, a similar obligation is enforced in
three jurisdictions by an action for wrongful life and, in others, through
parental actions for wrongful birth. 37
As a result, recognition of a patient's right to recover her pecuniary
losses is a defensible compromise. Although it is a second-best remedy, it is
not unprincipled."' In its ideal form, this limited right to recover would
provide compensation for all pecuniary harm, not simply extraordinary
expenses. However, credit should be given to the defendant for any pecuniary gains caused by the wrongful conduct, such as continued pension or
Social Security benefits.239
C.

Synthesizing the Justice Issues

To summarize, the goal of achieving corrective justice supports the
recovery of compensatory damages for all harms caused by the unconsented
and unjustified administration of life-sustaining care. The kinds of conduct
that will constitute a breach of duty may take a variety of shapes, ranging
from patent disregard of known wishes to failure to read the hospital chart.
When this misconduct occurs, corrective justice requires compensation
from the errant physician for any harm caused by the breach of duty
Surprisingly, the courts and commentators who are hostile to a cause
of action for "wrongful living" seem supportive of a right to partial recovery. Their willingness to allow partial recovery markedly distinguishes the
unconsented life support cases from the wrongful life cases. However, recognition of a right to partial recovery is less desirable than full recovery. It
would undercompensate those patients who suffer severe pain and those
whose primary grievance is the loss of religious or personal liberty. Thi,.
harsh result seems unnecessary given the weaknesses in the arguments
against full recovery. However, in states that doubt the ability of juries to
calculate general damages, a right to recover for pecuniary harm or, more
narrowly, for extraordinary expenses would be preferable to rejection of the
action altogether. Courts should resist, however, the temptation to adopt
the Ohio Supreme Court's distinction between direct and indirect harms
because both types of harm pose the same policy issues.
237. Protection of this interest is incomplete to the extent that courts preclude recovery for
ordinary support expenses or reduce parental recovery to reflect the joys of parenting.

238. See Peters, supra note 148, at 532.
239. The extent of this recovery will depend on how the collateral source rule is applied to
this unique setting. See DOBBS, supra note 80, § 3.8(1), at 266-69.
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VI.

DETERRENCE AND OVERDETERRENCE

Tort liability for unconsented life support could provide a much
needed incentive for physicians to respect the wishes of patients and their
proxies. Although managed care incentives may eventually eliminate
much of the need for this legal leverage, tort liability can currently play a
useful role in structuring appropriate physician incentives. Nevertheless,
courts should be sensitive to the risk that tort liability could unduly weaken
the physician's natural inclination to err on the side of life and should
also fashion the physician's substantive duties in a manner that reduces
this risk.
A.

Providing a Legal Incentive to Respect Patients and Proxies

Liability for compensatory damages would provide a much-needed
legal incentive for physicians and hospitals to respect the instructions of
patients and their proxies. 40 The prospect of liability would encourage
physicians and hospitals to internalize the value of self-determination to
their patients and, consequently, to expend an appropriate amount of their
own time and attention ascertaining and respecting patient wishes. Failure
to recognize a cause of action, on the other hand, would substantially
weaken-and effectively rewrite-the underlying substantive rights themselves.24' Because the threat of damages constitutes the most significant
legal sanction that physicians will realistically face for the violation of
patient rights,242 removing that threat would go a long way toward immunizing physician misconduct. Absent a court order, physicians would possess a de facto right to treat a patient against her wishes-a right of
eminent domain over the patient herself. Laws intended to empower
patients and their proxies would, instead, have simply deregulated physicians. Obviously, this is inconsistent with the spirit of the legal doctrines
recognizing the rights of patients and their proxies to refuse medical care.
Recognition of a cause of action would help to offset the current tendency of the law to encourage overtreatment. Fear of legal liability cur240. See, e.g., Gasner, supra note 65, at 504; Hackleman, supra note 85, at 1371-72; William
Prip & Anna Morretti, Compliance: The Missing Component in Patient Autonomy Laws, EXPERIENCE, Spring 1996, at 4, 9.
241. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 80, § 1.7, at 23 (observing that the remedy defines the
right); Hackleman, supra note 85, at 1381 (concluding that a right with no remedy is worthless);
Knapp & Hamilton, supra note 79, at 276 (stating that patients would have "no right at all"
without an action for damages).
242. See infra text accompanying notes 246-251.
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rently makes health care providers reluctant to withhold treatment. 243 In
the words of the bioethicist Ruth Macklin, "Where it was once physicians
who overtreated patients because they believed it was their moral obligation to continue therapy, it is now hospital administrators and risk managers who often insist on overtreatment out of fear of medical-legal
liability. '244 This picture is fully consistent with the assumptions of Dr.
Nancy Dickey, then chairwoman of the board of the American Medical
Association, who stated, "The thinking has been that if you do intervene
and you shouldn't have, the worst that will happen is that the patient will
live a little longer and that you'll never be held accountable if you keep the
patient from dying."24
The incentive to ignore the directives of patients and their proxies
under these circumstances is obvious. In fact, providers who are paid for
246
these unwanted services are financially rewarded for their misconduct.
Moreover, the "[a]bsense of penalty provisions in most advance directive
laws fosters a belief among health care providers that noncompliance is
legally acceptable. 2 47 This unbalanced legal message reinforces the existing preference of many physicians to follow the beat of their own drum and
the apparent aversion of many physicians to time-consuming discussions
with patients and their families. The losers in this story are the patients
and proxies who have their own ideas about the humane limits of lifesustaining care.
The need for deterrence materially distinguishes tort actions for
unconsented life support from actions for wrongful life. Courts concerned
about the policy implications of actions for wrongful life could reject those
243.

See Terri R. Fried et al., Limits of Patient Autonomy: Physician Attitudes and Practices

Regarding Life-Sustaining Treatments and Euthanasia, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 722, 724,
727 (1993) (finding that, when deciding whether to take a patient off a respirator, "a sizable
number of respondents [25.6%] cite the question of legality as their primary concern"); S. Van
McCrary et al., Treatment Decisions for Terminally Ill Patients: Physicians' Legal Defensiveness and
Knowledge of Medical Law, 20 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 364, 373 (1992) (finding that physicians' perception of legal risk influences their end-of-life treatment decisions and that these
perceptions are often incorrect); Mildred Z. Solomon et al., Decisions near the End of Life:
Professional Views on Life-Sustaining Treatments, 83 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 14, 19 (1993) (noting
that clinicians' uncertainty about law, ethics, and professional standards manifests itself in decisions to withdraw treatment). These legal fears are greatly exaggerated. Some scholars note that
there has never been a successful suit or prosecution against a physician for respecting the wishes
of a patient or proxy. See, e.g., Gasner, supra note 65, at 504 n.35; Miller, supra note 65, at 184;
Prip & Morretti, supra note 240, at 8.
244. RUTH MACKLIN, ENEMIES OF PATIENTS 64 (1993).
245. Lewin, supra note 3, at 28.
246. See Milani, supra note 79, at 169-73; Prip & Moretti, supra note 240, at 9.
247. Prip & Moretti, supra note 240, at 10.
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actions and rely upon the parental action for wrongful birth to provide at
least some deterrence."' In the context of decisions about life-sustaining
care, however, the existing legal alternatives to an action by the patient for
compensatory damages have obviously proven inadequate.
Although providers who wrongfully administer life support potentially
face a number of sanctions,
including forfeiture of their right
. .•
250
• . to
251 payment,"'
professional discipline, and, in a few states, civil penalties or liability
for attorneys' fees, 52 these sanctions have not had a significant effect, perhaps because they are rarely enforced and have few teeth. As a result, they
represent a potentially useful supplement to a cause of action for general
damages, but not an effective substitute.
Recognition of a limited cause of action by the patient for pecuniary
losses would improve upon these options, but it, too, would have less
impact than an action for general damages. Similarly, recognition of a
family someusefl
claim "253
for emotional distress or for support expenses could provide
some useful deterrence.
It would be the functional equivalent of an
action for wrongful birth.2 "4 But the level of deterrence provided by the
family's claim would fall short of ideal unless patients were also allowed to
recover for the harm done to them. Otherwise, tortfeasors would escape
liability for some of the harm that they have caused and, thus, would not
have to internalize these costs in their decision making.
At the same time, the potential impact of an action for compensatory
damages on physician behavior should not be overstated. Because relatively few of the victimized patients are likely to seek compensation and
because physician conduct is influenced by many other factors, the deterrent effect of tort liability is likely to fall well short of ideal. Consequently, a lasting solution will require a fundamental change in physician
culture, one that prioritizes the communication necessary to inform,
248. See supra text accompanying notes 200-208 (discussing the obstacles to recognition of a
similar cause of action at the end of life).

249. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.070 (Michie 1996); see also Marshall B. Kapp, Enforcing
Patient Preferences: Linking Payment for Medical Care to Informed Consent, 261 JAMA 1935
(1989).
250. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191 (West Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 44-77-100 (Law Co-op Supp. 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112 (1993).
251. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.12.070 (Michie 1996) (imposing a civil penalty of $1000
plus costs).
252. This award would be for the fees incurred by the family in obtaining an order to terminate life support. See, e.g., Battling v. Glendale Adventist Med. Ctr., 228 Cal. Rptr. 1847
(1986) (awarding $160,000 in attorneys' fees on remand). However, attorneys' fees are not
available in most cases. See 1 MEISEL, supra note 3, § 17.26, at 439.
253. Emotional distress claims would face substantial doctrinal obstacles. See supra note 205.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 204-207.
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ascertain, and respect patient wishes. At present, however, the prospects
for that change are bleak; the sponsors of the SUPPORT study spent
millions of dollars on a sophisticated intervention that had absolutely no
impact on physician behavior. While ethicists continue to explore new
ideas, none have yet been proven to be either effective or feasible on a
large scale. As a result, the law has a role to play.
At the very least, a carefully tailored cause of action for wrongful
treatment has the potential both to counterbalance the existing legal
incentives to disregard patient wishes and also to reinforce the social norms
supporting the rights of patients and their proxies. "[It's going to take a lot
to change [this culture]," said Daniel Callahan, a renowned ethicist and
former president of the Hastings Center; "one way that may happen is
through legal pressure and jury verdicts." '55
Compensatory damages would combine with nominal and punitive
damages to provide courts with a sensitive array of tools with which to pro256
tect patient interests.
B.

The Risk of Overdeterrence

Juxtaposed against this potential for a desirable impact on physician
behavior is the risk that tort liability could have an unwanted "chilling
effect," making physicians reluctant to initiate life support without clear
instructions from the patient. 257 One hospital lawyer has suggested that
liability "would cause health practitioners to be terribly confused about
which way to proceed if there was an emergency health-care decision."258
The threat of tort liability could conceivably cause physicians to delay
resuscitation while nurses combed the chart for firm guidance about heroic
efforts.
Accentuating the risk of undesirable overdeterrence is the evolution
of the health care industry towards managed care. Because managed care
organizations place an emphasis on cost control, they will have an obvious
incentive to grade hospitals and providers on their respect for advance
255. Lewin, supra note 3, at 28.
256. My thanks to David Partlett for bringing this to my attention.
257. Interestingly, this risk of overdeterrence has an analog in the wrongful life cases. Recognition of wrongful life liability could induce some physicians to pressure their pregnant
patients to have abortions following unplanned pregnancies. But the similarity between
wrongful life and unconsented care cases ends there, as wrongful birth actions would pose this
risk even if wrongful life actions were rejected. But see Bader v. Johnson, 675 N.E.2d 1119, 1123
(Ind. Ct. App. 1997) ("[Rlecognition of a claim for wrongful birth does not require physicians to
counsel abortion.").
258. Lewin, supra note 3, at 28.
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directives.!

Conceivably, this movement could make the SUPPORT
findings obsolete and eliminate the need for further legal incentives to
respect patient wishes. In fact, these financial pressures could ultimately
make undertreatment a more serious problem than overtreatment.
Notwithstanding these reasonable fears, there are several reasons for
doubting that the risk of overdeterrence requires the immunization of physician misconduct. First, and most importantly, the courts can protect
physicians from liability in those circumstances in which "erring on the
side of life" is justified, as it will be in the typical emergency, without
rejecting liability in cases in which the disregard of a patient's wishes is not
justified. Courts can do this by carefully tailoring the underlying cause of
action. Second, in nonemergency settings, physicians who have reasonable
doubts about the instructions they have received from a patient or proxy
can go to court for judicial guidance. Third, it is too soon to assess the
ultimate impact of managed care. Thus far, neither prospective payment
systems, such as Medicare's diagnosis-related groups, nor managed care
have eliminated widespread overtreatment. So long as the danger of overtreatment is pervasive, as it clearly is now, the arguments for a tort deterrent are powerful. And if the danger of undertreatment should worsen, the
law can and will provide the victims with a remedy for the unjustified failure to provide requested life support.260 It need not, however, deny a remedy to the victims of overtreatment. Both wrongs deserve legal redress.
C.

Tailoring the Cause of Action

Courts can free physicians to err on the side of life by carefully articulating safe harbors in which physicians are free to treat without fear of later
second guessing. There are two especially obvious candidates for a safe
harbor of this kind. The first involves physicians who render emergency
life support and neither know nor should know of a previous refusal of consent.26 ' The second involves physicians who continue life-sustaining care
because the instructions that they have received from the patient or proxy
259. See Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406, 1414 (7th Cir. 1995);
2 MEISEL, supra note 3, § 17.13, at 390 (predicting that physicians will face pressure to recommend the termination of care when it appears that there is no hope for recovery).
260. See, e.g., Peters, supra note 56 (discussing the protections provided by the Americans
with Disabilities Act).
261. See Allove v. Flower Hosp., No. L-96-329 (Ohio Ct. App. June 27, 1997), reprintedin 6
BNA HEALTH LAW REPORTER 1124 (1997)

HeinOnline -- 45 UCLA L. Rev. 722 1997-1998

Unconsented Life Support
are ambiguous.262 Under both of these circumstances, courts should permit
physicians to administer life-sustaining treatment until they receive a clear
refusal of consent. By recognizing safe harbors of this kind, courts can
provide physicians with the freedom to err on the side of life when doing so
is justified, while preserving liability for unjustified conduct, such as the
resuscitation of patients whose wishes were well known.
There are two additional scenarios in which physicians might seek the
protection of a safe harbor. The wisdom of providing them with immunity
in these two situations, however, is a close question. The first involves
physicians who must make an emergency treatment decision and who
should have been familiar with the patient's refusal of consent. These
physicians may contend that immunity would free them to err on the side
of life when they never checked or have forgotten the patient's wishes.
The second scenario involves physicians who have reasonable doubts about
the legal propriety of a request by the patient or proxy to terminate
life support. Arguably, they should have the freedom to continue lifesustaining care until the family obtains a court order. However, each of
these immunities has potential disadvantages that could outweigh their
potential benefits.
1.

Unreasonable Failure to Know Patient Wishes

Emergency physicians who have no reason to know about a previous
refusal of life-sustaining care have no reason to fear liability.263 But what
about the attending physician who has had ample opportunity to read the
patient's directive, but never bothered to do so? Traditional tort principles
would support recovery. Physicians are liable when they unreasonably fail
to familiarize themselves with clinical information contained in the
chart.264 They arguably have a similar obligation to acquaint themselves
with the patient's treatment preferences-perhaps even an obligation to
262.

Most general advance directives may suffer from this shortcoming. See, e.g., Teno et

al., Do Advance Directives, supra note 2, at 508 (concluding that only 22 of 688 advance directives were specific enough to control the later treatment decisions).
263. Traditionally, a physician does not commit a battery whenever she performs a medical
procedure without the patient's consent if the treatment is rendered in an emergency and it is
impossible to obtain consent. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892-892D, cmt. a, illus.

4& 5, cmt. b.
264.

See, e.g., Larrimore v. Homeopathic Hosp. Ass'n,.181 A.2d 573 (Del. 1962) (holding a

hospital liable when a nurse failed to read the chart); Killebrew v. Johnson, 404 N.E.2d 1194,
1197 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that a doctor's failure to read x-rays constituted submissible
negligence).
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inquire about them, just as they would elicit a patient's medical history."'
Yet, physicians routinely fail to do so.
And what of the physician who knew about the patient's preferences
and simply forgot? As a matter of traditional tort law, the privilege to render unconsented emergency treatment disappears when the physician
knows in advance that the patient would not consent. 266
Arguably, the extension of liability this far could put physicians in a
tactical quandary if an emergency arises and they have not yet familiarized
themselves with the patient's instructions or have forgotten them. Erring
in either direction could result in liability. Although it seems unlikely, it is
possible that physicians faced with this Hobson's choice would delay lifesustaining treatment while checking the patient's chart. Immunity from
tort liability would eliminate this tactical quandary and permit the attending physicians to err on the side of treatment.
Unfortunately, immunity would also remove the provider's incentive
to know and respect the wishes of the patient or her proxy. In fact,
immunity would create a positive disincentive to learn this information.
Once physicians discover that they have more discretion if they are
unfamiliar with the governing instructions than if they know them, they
will have a powerful incentive not to ask their patients or proxies about
their preferences regarding end-of-life treatments, like CPR, and not to
read documents memorializing those preferences. Given this risk, immunity ought not be lightly granted.
The choice between immunity and liability ultimately turns on the
likelihood that liability would produce a significant chilling effect. My
own suspicion is that it is more likely to have a constructive impact, inducing hospitals to place the instructions given by patients or their proxies in
the charts, prompting physicians to read those instructions, and motivating
risk managers to devise better methods for informing nurses and physicians
265. See Oddi, supra note 78, at 662; see also PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL
ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 50 (1983) (concluding that the option of nontreatment
should be discussed with dying patients). But see lafelice v. Luchs, 501 A.2d 1040, 1049 (N.J.
1985) (holding that physicians owed parents no duty to inform them of a nontreatment option
when death was not a legally sanctioned alternative).
266. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892D cmt. a, illus. 5; see also Estate of Leach
v. Shapiro, N.E.2d 1047, 1053 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Malette v. Shulman, [1990] D.L.R. 321
(Can.) (holding that the emergency doctrine of necessity does not allow a physician to disregard
a patient's advance directive).
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quickly about patient preferences, such as the placement of color coded
signals on the charts.
Because we do not know the impact that liability would have, courts
and legislatures will have to rely on their instincts, aided in part by the
direction in which they prefer to err. That probably means that most
courts will deny compensatory damages in cases in which a physician must
make an immediate decision and has not read or cannot recall the patient's
instructions. But judges who share my belief that liability would induce a
more productive response could reasonably impose liability on physicians
who should have known better than to administer life-extending care.
2.

Reasonable Doubts About the Propriety of a Request
to Terminate Treatment

The second category of cases in which the risk of an undesirable
chilling effect warrants special consideration involves physicians who
continue treatment because they have reasonable doubts about the legal
propriety of the request to discontinue treatment. In some states, for
example, the obligation of physicians to respect treatment refusals by
pregnant patients 26726or mature minors2 may be unresolved. In other cases,
the legal authority of family members to make the treatment decision may
be unclear. 69 Sometimes physicians may doubt that the instructions they
have received from a legally authorized proxy are consistent with the
wishes or the interests of the patient. Absent the threat of tort liability,
physicians might err on the side of life in these situations. If they are
potentially liable for overtreatment, however, they might be tempted to
defer to the disputed request-not because it seems defensible, but because
deference is the route most likely to avoid litigation.
Thus far, the courts have been unwilling to impose liability in cases
like these.2 70 Instead, they have limited the patients and their families to
equitable relief. By preferring equitable relief to legal redress, these courts
have not only reversed the normal (albeit weak) preference for legal
" ' but they
relief,27
have also deviated from the normal tort practice of judging the reasonability of challenged behavior in hindsight. In effect, they
267. See e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990) (en banc).
268. See e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322 (I1. 1989).
269. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Miss. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); Grace
Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum, 623 N.E.2d 513 (N.Y. 1993).
270. See supra note 66.
271. See DOBBS, supra note 80, § 1.1, at 3.
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have ruled that damages
are available only when the physician's legal duty
72
at the time was clear.
Presumably, the courts have protected physicians from hindsight
scrutiny in borderline cases so that physicians can err on the side of life
until they receive instructions from a court. 273 However, these physicians
could have provided themselves with the same protection by going to court
themselves.2 " Consequently, the disposition of these cases ultimately turns
on whether families or physicians should bear the burden of going to court
when physicians balk at the request of a patient or proxy. If physicians
should bear this responsibility, then it would be fair to impose liability on
those physicians who fail to do so and are later determined to have wrongfully kept the patient alive. If, instead, patients and families should shoulder the obligation of seeking judicial assistance, then physicians who have
reasonable doubts should be protected from liability until a court rules on
the dispute, even if the court later concludes that the physician's concerns
were unfounded.
On whom should this burden be imposed? The answer may turn on
the specific factual setting. Because competent patients have a virtually
unfettered right to refuse life-sustaining medical care, physicians who doubt
the propriety of clear requests made by currently or previously competent
patients should either obtain judicial permission to continue treatment or
else run the risk of tort liability. As an Ohio appellate court once concluded, "[T]he patient's right to refuse treatment is absolute until
the qual' 75
ity of the competing interests is weighed in a court proceeding."
At the opposite extreme are cases in which the past preferences of a
previously competent patient are reasonably in doubt and no legally
authorized proxy has been appointed. Under these circumstances, it seems
reasonable to ask the family to obtain decision-making authority from a
court or to obtain a court order mandating the cessation of treatment. In
272. And, by effectively forcing patients to seek equitable, rather than legal, relief in borderline cases, these courts have also fashioned an exception to the traditional rule that plaintiffs
need not mitigate anticipated harm by seeking prior equitable relief. See, e.g., Robinson v.
Carney, 632 A.2d 106, 108 (D.C. 1993); 2 MARILYN MINZER ET AL., DAMAGES IN TORT
ACTIONS§

16.22, at 16-34 to -35 (1982).

273. See Grace Plaza, 623 N.E.2d at 516; Gasner, supra note 65, at 503; Nancy Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARV. L. REV. 375, 420 (1988) (noting the "near-sacrosanct" injunction to "err on the side of life").
274. See Gasner, supra note 65, at 513-14 (suggesting that the underlying issue is who must
go to court).
275. Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047, 1051-52 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
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Grace Plaza of Great Neck, Inc. v. Elbaum,276 for example, the patient's
wishes were unclear and New York did not recognize independent decisions
by family members. As a result, the court concluded that the physician
should be free to administer life-sustaining treatments until the family
obtained a court order.
A much closer case would be presented, however, if clear instructions
have been given by a proxy authorized by state law to make treatment
decisions. Depending upon state law, these legally empowered proxies may
be family members, judicially appointed guardians, statutorily authorized
surrogates, or persons named as an attorney-in-fact under a durable power
of attorney. 277 On the one hand, these proxies have been given prima facie
legal power to make the treatment decision. From this perspective, physicians who object to their decisions should take their objections to court or
else exercise any rights of conscience they may have under state law. They
should not unilaterally continue unwanted care.
On the other hand, it is the proxy who seeks to end the patient's life.
Under these circumstances, the New York Court of Appeals has concluded
that there is "nothing unfair in placing the burden of instituting legal proceedings on those seeking to discontinue treatment."27 8 According to the
court, this allocation of responsibility furthers the goal of erring on the side
of life and places the burdenr279of going forward on those with best access to
evidence of patient preferences.
As a result, the court concluded that a
provider who "entertains doubts about the state of the law" or who "has
legitimate professional reservations about the procedure requested" could
either "seek a judicial determination of the matter itself or insist that the

family do so." 2'
In addition, proxies will often have conflicts of interest that could
color their judgment. The patient's illness may heavily tax the proxy's
emotional and financial resources. Ongoing treatment can also threaten
the family's inheritance and monopolize the time and emotional energies
of caretakers. These competing pressures could affect the judgment of even
the most loyal proxy.
276. 623 N.E.2d 513 (N.Y. 1993); see also McVey V.Englewood Hosp. Ass'n, 524 A.2d 450
(N.J. 1987) (per curiam) (holding that, absent a legal guardian, the physician had no duty to
determine and evaluate the veracity of the patient's purported orally expressed wishes).
277. See generally MEISEL, supra note 3, at chs. 5, 12, 14.
278. Grace Plaza, 623 N.E.2d at 515.
279. See id. at 516.
280. Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
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Legitimate arguments, therefore, can be made in support of either
allocation of the responsibility to go to court. However, a recent study
found that the economic hardship on family members did not affect their
ability to predict patient preferences.'8' My own intuition is that courts
will usually defer to the proxy when the case goes to court. As a result,
forcing surrogates to go to court each time a physician balks at their
requests is likely to produce a waste of judicial and private resources.
Placing the burden of going forward on physicians, instead, would encourage them to identify those cases in which the surrogate's request is not
merely inconsistent with their own preferences, but is also most likely to be
deemed inappropriate by a neutral third party.
Placing the obligation on physicians will also assign the burden on the
party best positioned to know that a dispute is imminent. Families and
patients will often be unaware that their physician is unwilling to respect
their wishes until the unwanted heroic efforts have taken place. Physicians, on the other hand, will appreciate the potential conflict from the
moment that they receive instructions from the patient or proxy. Placing
the burden of initiating litigation on physicians, consequently, will force
them, first, to read the treatment directives given by the patient or proxy
and, second, to determine whether they have a serious objection to the
proxy's instruction. If they do have reservations, they will then have both
an incentive and an opportunity to resolve the issue with the proxy or go to
court before the actual treatment decision needs to be made.
For patients and their families, furthermore, the right to go to court
will often be meaningless. Patients whose proxies are unaware that their
instructions will be disregarded cannot be expected to seek a court order.
At other times, families will lack the resources, sophistication, or emotional reserves necessary to go to court during a time of family crisis.
Because there are good reasons for assigning the responsibility to
physicians as well as good reasons for assigning it to proxies, courts are
likely to struggle with this issue. If courts are serious, however, about delegating decision-making power to patients and their proxies, then the
burden of seeking judicial guidance should be placed on physicians.
Physicians who have a reasonable opportunity to transfer the patient or to
obtain judicial guidance should be obliged to use that opportunity or risk
later liability. This resolution respects the prima facie allocation of
decision-making power to the proxy, rather than to the physician, while
281. See Kenneth Lovinsky et al., Is Economic Hardship on the Families of the Seriously Ill
Associated with Patient and Surrogate Preferences?, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1737 (1996).
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providing breathing room for physicians who have reasonable doubts about
proxy requests.
D.

Synthesizing the Deterrence Analysis

To summarize, tort liability for unconsented life support will provide a
much needed counterbalance to current legal incentives to overtreat.
Nevertheless, courts should be sensitive to the risk that tort liability could
unduly weaken the physician's natural inclination to err on the side of life.
This risk can be minimized if courts limit tort liability to those circumstances in which the wishes of the patient or her legally authorized proxy
are clearly communicated and the physician has had a reasonable opportunity to learn about these wishes. Under those circumstances, physicians
should bear the burden of going to court when they disagree with the
directions of the patient or proxy.
CONCLUSION
Not surprisingly, the wrongful life analogy provides only a starting
point for examining tort claims at the end of life. Although the end-of-life
cases are, of course, similar to the wrongful life cases in their contention
that life itself is a compensable injury, they also differ in important respects
that complicate the analysis.
In the wrongful life setting, for example, courts have worried that they
would offend public policy if they endorsed parental allegations that a child
born due to provider carelessness would have been better off unborn. At
the end of life, on the other hand, public policy clearly supports the right of
patients and, in many circumstances, their proxies to refuse life-extending
care. Our willingness to permit these decisions reflects the tragic realities
of life, not a repudiation of it. Under these circumstances, recognition of a
right to compensatory damages would encourage respect for patient rights
by doctors, hospitals, and nursing homes who would otherwise have little
legal incentive to carefully investigate patient wishes or ardently respect
them.
Admittedly, the task of calculating general damages in cases of
unwanted life support will be more difficult than it is in traditional* tort
cases because juries must place a value on the benefits of prolonged life.
However, there are several reasons to believe that juries will be able to
perform the task fairly. First, the presence and severity of any harm done
to the patient can be determined by balancing the benefits of prolonged
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life against the burdens. No knowledge of death or nonexistence is needed.
Second, jurors will be able to call on their own family experiences and the
considered decisions of the patients and their families to help the jury
make reasoned judgments. No equivalent information is available in
wrongful life cases. Third, the only aspect of the damages calculation that
will be uniquely difficult is the measurement of life's benefits, an issue on
which the tortfeasor, not the patient, should bear the burden of proof.
Finally, our limited experience with these cases does not support the
speculation that juries and the trial judges who supervise cannot reach
defensible verdicts.
Consequently, the arguments against allowing recovery based on the
wrongful life analogy have serious weaknesses. At the same time, the policy objectives of fairness and deterrence support recovery. As between the
patient who has been wrongfully kept alive and the physician who has
administered treatment without consent or an adequate justification, corrective justice requires that the physician compensate the patient for any
harm caused by the breach of duty. An action for unconsented life support
is also more badly needed than one for wrongful life. This is because
wrongfully resuscitated patients lack the financial protections that wrongful birth actions provide for children whose wrongful life claims are
rejected.
Furthermore, rejection of an action for damages would rewrite the substantive law of death and dying, effectively conferring upon physicians a
right to treat patients against their wishes until a court has authorized the
cessation of treatment. Although patients and their families could theoretically seek equitable relief, this remedy will often be inadequate.
Patients and proxies who are unaware that their instructions will be
ignored cannot be expected to seek judicial assistance. At other times,
families will lack the money, emotional resources, or sophistications necessary to go to court during a time of family crisis.
Nevertheless, courts will understandably be concerned that tort
liability could cause physicians to hesitate in emergencies or unduly
weaken the physician's natural inclination to err on the side of life. This
risk can be minimized if courts limit liability to those cases in which the
wishes of the patient or her proxy were clearly communicated and the
physician has had a reasonable opportunity to learn about them. This safe
harbor should provide physicians with the breathing room that they need.
If, however, the instructions from the patient or a legally empowered proxy
are clear and the physician has had ample opportunity to ascertain them,
physicians and hospitals should bear the burden of going to court for
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guidance when physicians and families disagree. Those who do not should
shoulder the risk that a court will later conclude that they wrongfully
treated the patient.
Current judicial and academic critics of an action for "wrongful living" have suggested, however, that the goals of compensation and deterrence can be adequately advanced by recognizing a battery action for
extraordinary expenses. Their willingness to allow partial recovery is
noteworthy. By endorsing a remedy permitted in only a tiny minority of
the wrongful life cases, these critics have implicitly acknowledged that
cases involving unconsented life support cases are materially different from
the wrongful life cases.
Unfortunately, partial recovery would be decidedly inferior to general
damages as a matter of both justice and deterrence. It would undercompensate those patients who suffer severe pain and those whose primary
grievance is the loss of religious or personal liberty. This harsh result seems
unnecessary because the arguments against full recovery have serious
weaknesses. However, in states that refuse to let the jury place a negative
value on life or doubt the ability of juries to calculate general damages, a
right to compensation for pecuniary harm or, more narrowly, a right to
reimbursement for extraordinary expenses would be preferable to rejection
of the action altogether."'2
These conclusions are not meant to suggest that actions for compensatory damages will provide a cure for the plague that prompts them. Many,
maybe most, patient and proxy directives are too general or vague to
provide the necessary guidance to physicians. In addition, any fundamental change in physician attitudes and behavior will probably have to
come from a shift in the culture of medicine. Nevertheless, the law has a
proper role to play in these disputes. Tort liability can, at a minimum,
provide redress to those patients whose rights have been clearly violated.
In addition, it can reinforce the social consensus that the decisions of
patients and their proxies matter. More optimistically, it can also provide a
more properly balanced set of legal signals and, in so doing, encourage a
few more physicians to respect patient wishes.

282. Courts should, however, resist the temptation to adopt the Ohio Supreme Court's distinction between direct and indirect harms because both types of harm pose the same policy
issues. See supra text accompanying notes 220-222.
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